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The Internal Organizational Structure 
of the Industrial State-Owned Enterprises 
in the People's Republic of China: 1949-1986 
Shahzadi Covell 
In this paper， 1 am concerned with the general background for what 
has been the key component part of the programme of economic and 
political reform that has been pursued in the People's Republic of 
China (PRC) in the years following the historic 3rd Plenum of the 
11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC)， as
this was held from 18 December to 22 December 1978.'11 The part of 
the reform programme that 1 focus on is the reform of the large-
scale industrial state-owned enterprises (industrial SOEs)， with the 
particular aspect of state industrial sector reform picked out for dis-
cussion being the internal organizational structure relating to the 
management of the industrial SOEs. The reform of the industrial 
SOEs has been central to the transition that has been effected in 
the PRC since 1978 from an economic sys旬mbased in political com・
mand direction to what is recognizable as a mixed economic system. 
This process of transition in the economic sphere has involved the 
pa凶ialsubjection of the industrial SOEs to the disciplinary mecha-
nisms of the market. However， the reform of the industrial SOEs 
has involved much more than the mere extension to the state indus-
trial sector of measures of partial market liberalization. For the re-
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form of the state industrial secto1' in the PRC has proceeded 
through the establishing of a law-based corporation system， and 
this has involved the industrial SOEs coming to acquire the inde-
pendent status essential to the possession of co1'porate pe1'sonality 
unde1' law. 
In the judgment of this autho1'， it is the incorporation of the in-
dust1'ial SOEs， 1'athe1' than the bare fact of thei1' subjection to ma1'-
ket disciplina1'Y mechanisms， that has been fundamental to the di-
rection of the economic 1'eform st1'ategy as followed in the PRC since 
1978. Fo1' the inco1'poration of the indust1'ial SOEs has b1'ought 
about nothing less than a 1'adical t1'ansfo1'mation in thei1' legal and 
political-institutional status， and hence in the matte1' of thei1' 1'ela-
tion to the state. So， for example， inco1'pol叫ionhas involved the 
application to the indust1'ial SOEs of the p1'inciples of sha1'e-holding 
based in limited liability with respect to the gene1'ation of capital 
investment funding for the enterprises. This has resulted in a sig圃
nificant diversification in the sou1'ces of capital investment funding 
fo1' the state industl'ial secto1'， such as to p1'ovide for the investment 
of non-state-supplied capital and hence fo1' the development of non骨
state岨heldownel'ship 1'ights in the means of indust1'ial production. 
Then again， the assignment of corpo1'ate pe1'sonality to the indus-
trial SOEs has ca1'ried with it the securing to them of a formal indか
pendence in law， where this has served to 1'elease the incorporated 
indust1'ial SOEs f1'om the constraints of state‘autho1'ed political ? ? ? ? ?
command economic di1'ectives. This consequence of inco1'poration is 
of pa1'amount impo1'tance in 1'elation to the argument of this paper. 
For the release of the industrial SOEs from control through political 
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command direction， as this has come to them by the acquisition of 
corporate person status in 1aw， has gone together with the relin-
quishing by the industrial SOEs of the essentially political-
administrative status that be10nged to them in the pre-reform era of 
prior to 1978. 
It is vital in exp1aining economic reform in the PRC since 1978 
to understand that the industrial SOEs in the pre-reform era were 
integral components of the system of government and po1itical ad-
ministration， and that， as such， the industria1 SOEs in that era had 
the status of political喧administrativeentities， or， touse the official 
term， govemment work units. It is vital also to understand that 
the scale ofthe state industrial sector that pertained to the political-
administrative system was vast， and that the vastness of the state 
industrial sector stands out a日oneof the most salient features of 
the system of government and political administration in the PRC 
in the pre-reform era. Thus it was that at the time of the 3rd Ple-
num of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC in December 1978， 
there were no fewer than 348，000 industria1 enterprises， with some 
90，000 enterprises comprising the sector of the large田sca1e，strategic 
industrial SOEs. The latter were foundational in the economic or-
der， since they accounted for almost 91 percent of the total indus-
trial output of the PRC， contributed between 70 to 80 percent of the 
total revenues accruing to the state treasury， and emp10yed no 1ess 
than 40 million workers. In addition， the large珊scaleindustria1 
SOEs were the elite production units in the PRC， inthe respect 
that they received the bulk of the state嗣suppliedcapital investment 
funding， and in the respect that the enterprise staff and workers 
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九
were cushioned through the provision of a social security in会astruc-
ture which served to meet most of the basic requirements of ordi-
nary family life.121 
It was through the system of govemment and political admini-
stration that the industrial SOEs were rendered subject to the sys-
tem of political∞mmand economic direction， as this was adopted in 
the PRC in the years following its founding in 1949 as the basis for 
the organization of industrial production. Hence出edevelopment of 
the political command economic system in the PRC， as it related to 
the state industrial sector， was intimately bound up with the estab-
lishing of the basic institutional structure of the state， as this con-
cemed the foundational organs of govemment and political admini-
stration. The institutional structure of the state in the PRC was ef-
fectively established in 1954 with the promulgation of the State 
Constitution， and this institutional structure of govemment and po・
litical administration persists to this day， as is underlined by the 
restatement of the terms of the 1954 State Constitution in the cur-
rent State Constitution whose promulgation came in 1982.131 Central 
among出einstitutions of govemment and political administration 
referred to in the State Constitution were the office of State Presi-
dent and出eNational People's Congress as the supreme legislative 
power in the PRC. Also central was the State Council of the PRC. 
This body was defined as the supreme org鉱 1of state administration， 
and， as such， itsuperseded the Govemment Administrative Council 
which had exercised executive powers in the PRC prior to 1954. The 
State Council was， and remains， an administrative rather than leg-
islative organ of govemment. However雪 theState Council has al耐
??
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月raysexercised law-making powers in relation to its administrative 
functions within the framework set by the state legislation enacted 
through the National People's Congress. So， for example， the rules 
and regulations possessing legal effect that the State Council issues 
have been crucial in the development of the state industrial sector， 
and not least with respect to the internal organizational structure 
set for the management of the industrial SOEs which forms the 
subject-matter of this paper.141 
The State Council comprises a complex political-administrative 
structure， with this being based in the Ministries and Commissions 
which form its constituent departmental administrative organs. In 
the years following its establishment in 1954， the Statc Council 
structure came to comprehend departmental administrative organs 
exercising responsibility for the strategic industrial sectors， such as 
machineゐuilding，iron and steel and textiles， as well as departmen叫
tal administrative organs that discharged responsibilities relating to 
the overall direction of the economic order， such as the State Plan-
ning Commission， the State Economic Commission， the Ministry of 
Finance， the Ministry of Labour and the People's Bank of China. 
The departmental administrative organs of the State Council， as re柑
ferred to here， formed the institutional framework at the level of 
central state government for the exercise of the powers of political 
command economic direction with respect to the means of industrial 
production， and especially so with respect to ownership control and 九
centralized economic planning. Thus it was the departmental aι 
ministrative organs of the State Council that bore ownership rights 
in the industrial SOEs. Likewise， the departmental administrative 
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organs of the State Council played the critical role of determining 
the plans relating to production and capital investment strategies 
for the industrial SOEs and dictating these to the enterprise ma任
agement officials， tothe end that the industrial SOEs should fulfil 
the state-stipulated production targets set within the framework of 
the national economic plans. 
The State Council political-administrative structure provided 
for a centralized system of political command economic direction of 
the means of industrial production. In the event， however， the 
State Council， inthe era of political command economics， was al-
ways pitted against the local levels of government in the exercise of 
political command directional control of the industrial SOEs. The 
tensions regarding political command jurisdiction over the indus-
trial SOEs， as between the central and local levels of government 
and political administration in the PRC， were compounded by the 
overlapping in jurisdiction， functions and powers as between gov・
ernmental institutions at the central and local levels and the insti-
tutional agencies of the CPC which operated at the di釘erentlevels 
of state and society. Here， itis crucial to understand that the insti-
tutional agencies of the CPC have always functioned as political-
administrative agencies， and that the CPC has always been the 
partner of the governmental institutions pertaining to the state， as 
witness the common usage where the political-administrative 
九 authoritiesin the PRC are referred to as Party-State authorities 
and the ruling leadership elites are referred to as the Party-State 
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leadership. The political-administrative functions and powers of the 
CPC are well underlined in the control functions and powers that 
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the CPC discharged within the internal organizational structure of 
the industrial SOEs during the pre-reform period. Thus it was that 
from the earliest years of the system of political command economic 
direction， the industrial SOEs， intheir internal organization， were 
made subject to the supervision of the local-level CPC committees 
established within them， with the CPC committee secretaries pre-
sent血 theen旬rprisesbeing particularly active in -the direction of 
the system of enterprise workers' congresses. In consequence of 
this， the role of the workers' congresses had less to do with the con-
ventional trade union functions of representing the interests of 
workers， than it had to do with disseminating CPC propaganda and 
mobilizing grass-roots support for the policies of the Party幽State
leadership.'51 
The discussion of the internal organizational structure for the 
management of the industrial SOEs that 1 provide in this paper is 
taken up with the changes that took place to the structure of enter-
prise management organization 企om1949， and through to the first 
years of the post-1978 reform era. In specific terms， 1 describe the 
shi氏sthat occurred in the period under review in the authority re-
lations holding as between what were then the three main elements 
of the internal management organizational structure of the indus-
凶alSOEs; the enterprise management officials， the secretaries of 
也eCPC committees established in the industrial SOEs， and the en-
terprise workers and the trade union bodies' and workers' con-
gresses as the representative organs of the workers. At al times， 
the transformations that were e貸ectedin the internal organiza-
tional structure of the industrial SOEs， asdescribed in the paper， 
九
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closely tracked the successive phases in the development of the in-
stitutions of government and political administration in the PRC， as 
these different phases concerned the changing power balance as be世
tween the central level of state government， the local government 
authorities and the CPC and its institutional agencies. 
In the first section of the paper， 1 describe the origins of the 
state-owned industrial sector in the PRC between 1949 and 1953. 
ー 、 ，
?
? ? ?
?
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Here， 1 touch briefly on the economic assistance programme pro時
vided to the PRC by the Soviet Union in the early 1950s， and on the 
importance of Soviet aid in the development of the state industrial 
sector in the PRC， and， hence， inthe establishing of the industrial 
SOEs. 1n the second section of the paper， 1 examine the period 
from 1953 to 1956， when there took place a consolidation of the po・
litical command economic system in the PRC. The form of political 
command economic system that was adopted in the PRC at this 
time was that of the Soviet form d、politicalcommand economic di-
rection， where there existed a higlliy centralized organizational con耐
trol structure for industrial produじtionplanning， and for industrial 
enterprise management， as exercised through the institutions of 
state government and political administration. Here， 1 emphasize 
the system of industrial management established for the industrial 
SOEs in the period of Soviet-style political command economics. 
This was the system of factory director responsibility based in the 
organizational principles of what was known as one-man manage-
ment. 1 also discuss the system of job-assignment under the politi-
cal command economic system， which was based in the centralized 
direction of workers in the state industrial sector， and the central-
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ized system of state句stipulateddifferentiated wage and bonus rates 
for the state-sector industrial workers. In addition， some considera-
tion is given to the establishing of a welfare and. social security irト
企astructurefor the industrial 80Es， and to the part played by the 
trade union organizations acting for the industrial workers in the 
development of the welfare and social security system in the state 
industrial sector. 
1n the third section of the paper， 1 review the developments in 
the internal organizational structure for the management of the in回
dustrial 80Es from 1956 to the自tartof the reform era in 1978. This 
was the period that encompassed the disastrous programme of 
forced rapid industrial production known as the Great Leap For-
ward， and the era of social and political turmoil that was the Cul噂
tural Revolution. The period of the Great Leap Forward and the 
Cultural Revolution was one where， under the leadership of Mao 
Zedong， there was mounted a sustained attack on the project for the 
centralization of decision帽makingpowers in the institutions of state 
government and political administration， and where， in accordance 
with Maoist doctrines， there took placヒageneral decentralization in 
political decision-making powers， save for an abortive attempt to re-
store central-level governmental powers in the early 1960s. The as-
sault on centralization in government and political administr叫 ion
extended also to centralization in economic organization， with Mao 
Zedong opposing himself vigorously from 1956 onwards to the 80-
viet form of political command economic system as it had been es-
tablished in the PRC in the early 1950s. 
In respect of the industrial 80Es and their internal manage-
/¥. 
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ment organizational structure， the period from 1956 to 1978， as 1 
describe it， was the period when the one-man management form of 
factory director responsibility system was set aside in favour of a 
management structure based in the leadership of the CPC commit-
tee secretaries. This was to contribute to the economic catastrophe 
of the Great Leap Forward， when CPC officials usurped manage-
ment responsibilities. 1t was also to lead to the industrial anarchy 
of the Cultural Revolution， when even the regular CPC officials 
were displaced by revolutionary committee organizations in the in-
dustrial SOEs which were dedicated to mobilizing the industrial 
workers in opposition to the allegedly counter嗣revolutionazγprac-
tices of managerialist elitism， wage-bonus di妊治官ltialismand cen-
tralized state-governmental command organization. 
The fourth and final section of the paper contains a discussion 
of the reform of the internal management organizational structure 
of the industrial SOEs in the period 合om1978加 1986，when there 
were issued through the State Council certain key regulations relat-
ing to the position of the management officials， the CPC committee 
officials and the workers' representative bodies within the internal 
organization of the industrial SOEs. As 1 describe it， the period 
from 1978 to 1986 saw the Party-State leadership acting to restore 
the internal organizational structure of the industrial SOEs follow-
ing the collapse in industrial management of the years of the Cul-
tural Revolution. However， italso saw the Party-State leadership 
re-establishing the internal management organizational structure of 
the industrial SOEs， but only in the context of the implementation 
of the general reform-era policy of decentralizing economic decision-
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making powers from the state to the industrial SOEs which marked 
the abandonment by the Party剛Stateleadership of the system of po・
litical command direction of industrial production. 
The principal result of this， as 1 explain， was the establishing 
through the 1986 State Council regulations of an internal manage-
ment organizational structure for the industrial SOEs that was， in
principle， tobe based in a clear differentiation in role， functions and 
powers as between the management officials， the CPC committee 
secretaries and the representative bodies of the industrial workers. 
In the event， the application of role and function differentiation to 
the internal organization of the industrial SOEs served to underline 
the economic decision-making authority of the enterprise managers 
in respect of the CPC officials and the workers' representatives. The 
effective reassertion of the principles of the factory director respon幽
sibility system in the 1986 State Council regulations was to be fully 
confirmed in the landmark statute in state industrial sector reform 
in the PRC， for which the 1986 regulations were by way of a prepa-
ration: the Enterprise Law of the PRC of 1988.161 In the wider con-
text， as 1 conclude， the reforms made to the internal management 
organizational structure of the industrial SOEs in the period lead-
ing up to the 1988 Enterprise Law went a substantial way towards 
laying the foundations for the incorporation of the industrial SOEs， 
as in accordance with the landmark statute which gave determinate 
legal form to the principles governing the emerging corporation sys-
tem in the PRC: the Corporation Law of the PRC， as promulgated 
in December 1993.171 
? 、 、
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i. 1949-1953: the Origins of the Industrial State-Owned Enter-
1へ
prlses 
The origins of what were to become the industrial SOEs in the PRC 
go back to April 1949， and the issuing in that month of the historic 
Proclamation of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. ln the Proc-
lamation， an explicit appeal was made to the personnel and workers 
who were currently employed in the principal industrial enterprises， 
or， as these were referred to， the bureaucratic capital enterprises. 
According to this， the industrial personnel and workers in the bu-
reaucratic capital enterprises were required to continue with usual 
work practices， and to maintain the capital， machinery， technical 
designs， accounts and files of the enterprises， until the projected 
People's Government would be in a position to place the enterprises 
under its direct control. It was also laid down in the Proclamation 
that the industrial management 0田cialswere to have direct respon-
sibility for the protection of al industrial capital and assets pertain-
ing t冶 theenterprises. This represented a substantial proportion of 
the national wealth. For in the estimate白ofthe CPC， the bureau-
cratic capital at the time of the April 1949 Proclamation constituted 
about 60 percent of al industrial capital in China， with the mining， 
transporlation and communications sectors receiving about 80 per-
cent of the fixed capital investment.'RI 
Following the founding of the PRC by the CPC in October 1949， 
the military control committees of the CPC moved quickly to bring 
the bureaucratic capital enterprises under their direction. Thus it 
was that by 1950 the military control committees had taken over 
about 2，800 industrial enterprises and about 2，400 financial enter-
? ?
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prises， with the enterprises being subjected to rapid restructuring to 
facilitate their inclusion as part of a specifically state-owned eco・
nomic sphere. However， the general economic situation in the 
newly established PRC remained parlous. For many leading indus-
trialists and entrepreneurs had fled China at the time of the victory 
of the CPC， and the collapse in the various industrial sectors that 
this occasioned resulted in unemployment for many ~ndustrial work-
ers in what were conditions of a spiralling hyper-inflation which 
reached as high as 500 percent. The economic crisis that came in 
the first six or so months of the PRC was grave， and it has been es-
timated that， by May 1950， most of the large cities had each some 
380，000 to 400，000 or more unemployed workers who had" been laid 
off work following factory closures.191 
In the circumstances of mid酬1950，the deteriorating economic 
conditions posed a significant threat to the survival of the PRC， and 
to the maintenance of CPC control. As a response 旬 this，Mao Ze-
dong took the opportunity of the 3rd Plenary Session of the Na-
tional Congress of the CPC of June 1950 to deliver a speech where 
he called on the Party-State leadership to provide immediate assis-
tance for the newly jobless workers， and to implement measures to 
tackle the problem of unemployment in the m弐jorcitiesyol Following 
the lead of Mao Zedong， the Party欄Stateleadership adopted a range 
of policy initiatives directed at restoring economic confidence， here 
moving 旬 bringal financial capital under its control so as to halt 
位lerun on the banks and to contain the inflationary pressures. At 
the same time， the Party-State leadership appealed to the urban 
workers， particularly those in the large cities， tocontinue working 
????
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and to support the new CPC regime. To bolster this appeal， liberal 
trade union legislation was enacted， which ensured better job secu-
rity for the urban industrial workers. AIso， there was the crucial 
measure taken by the Government Administrative Council on 17 
June 1950， which consisted in a directive providing that the state 
government would guarantee al workers adequate employment.1l1 
As a further important confidence-enhancing measure， the Party-
State leadership gave the assurance that it had no plans to disrupt 
industrial production through the forcible expropriation of the in-
dustrial enterp1'ises. Through its bold initiatives dating from June 
1950， the Party-State leadership was able to begin to build broad 
popular suppo1't fo1' a comprehensive industrial policy that it pre-
sented as being aimed not at the plundering of bureaucratic capital， 
but aimed rather at the gradual subordination of the industrial sec-
tor to rights of state ownership. 1n this way， the foundations were 
laid in the PRC for what was to become the system of the industrial 
SOES.1il 
By 1952， the Party-State leadership had succeeded in stabiliz齢
ing the economic conditions in the PRC， and in bringing the greater 
part of the economic sphere under the control and direction of the 
CPC and the state-governmental institutions， and principally 80 as 
in the form of industrial SOEs. However， itwas generally accepted 
among the Party-State leadership that the industrial base of the 
PRC remained very weak. For the traditional indu8trial centres in 
the North-East and in the coastal cities， such a8 Shanghai and 
Tianjin， had been hard hit during the civil war， and their factory 
plant and equipment stood in urgent need of capital investment and 
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technological upgrading. To remedy the situation， the Party-State 
leadership acted within the framework of the Sino-Soviet Friend-
ship Treaty of February 1950， in order to negotiate technology 
transfer agreements with the Soviet Union. The technology trans-
fer agreements were concluded， primarily， soas to facilitate the im-
plementation of the policy of rapid industrialization that was pro-
jected for枇leFirst Five Year Plan which the Party~State leadership 
went on to discuss and begin preparing in 1953. In the event， the 
Soviets undertook to build 156 large-scale industrial enterprise com-
plexes on the tum刷keybasis. It was agreed not only that the SovI-
ets should provide loans and industrial technology， but also that 
they should give concrete assistance in such areas as the prospect-
ing for natural resources， the selection of factory sites， the comple-
tion of technical designs， the supply of machinery and equipment， 
the ∞nstruction and installation of plant， personnel training， and 
the trial and operationalization of the new factories. In terms of 
human resources and expertise， the Soviets dispatched some 3，000 
technicians to the PRC， while the authorities in the PRC sent over 
some 7，000 students and 5，000 trainees to the Soviet Union in order 
to learn Russian and to study Soviet technology."31 
Between 1955 and 1959， althe projected 156 industrial enぬr-
prises (inc1uding an additional 143 ancillary enterprises) were es-
tablished in tl}.e PRC through Soviet assistance. As it tumed out， 
the Soviets supplied about 50 percent to 79 percent of the equip- 八
ment for the enterprises. This absorbed about one half of al the 
state-supplied industrial investment for the period of the First Five 
Year Plan， asthis was formally adopted at the 2nd session of the 1st 
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National People's Congress in July 1955.141 The industrial enter-
p1'ise establishments that we1'e built with Soviet assistance were the 
foundational large剛scaleindustrial SOEs， and these included the 
leading iron and steel ente1'p1'ises， the norトferrousmetallu1'gical en齢
te1'p1'ises， the coal mining ente1'pI匂es，oil 1'efineries， chemical plants， 
power stations， and the facto1'ies designated fo1' the p1'oduction of 
heavy machine1'Y， p1'ecision instruments， automobiles， ae1'oplanes 
and t1'acto1's. In addition， the th1'ee m勾01'i1'on and steel complexes 
in Anshan， Wuhan and Baotou we1'e al established with equipment 
supplied by the Soviet UnionY，1 Howeve1'， it should be understood 
that in spite of the large cont1'ibution that the Pa1'ty田Stateleade1'-
ship in the PRC was willing fo1' the Soviet Union to make to the 
1'apid industrialization p1'og1'amme in the 1950s， the Pa1'ty-State 
leade1'ship was even at that time beginning to encou1'age greate1' 
self-reliance fo1' the PRC (as ifin anticipation ofthe collapse in 1'ela-
tions between the PRC and the S邸 ietUnion that was to take place 
in the 1960s). Thus while the Pa.'七y司Stateleade1'ship of the mid-
1950s imported Soviet technical expertise fo1' the developing of the 
large“scale industrial sector， itsimultaneously called on the al1'eady 
established industrial ente1'p1'ises to depend mo1'e on indigenous ex-
pe1'tise and technology in the building of new facto1'ies and the en明
la1'ging of the existing indust1'ial base.161 
In addition to the impo1'ting of indust1'ial technology and expe1'司
八 tisef1'om the Soviet Union， the Chinese in the ea1'ly 1950s also 
studied closely the Soviet system of government and political ad-
88 
minist1'ation as this involved the cent1'alized political command sys帽
tem of economic planning and o1'ganization. The c1'ucial element of 
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the political command economic system in the PRC that was taken 
from Soviet practice was the so回calledone-man management system. 
This was the system where decision-making powers in the factories 
and enterprises were concentrated in the office of the factory man-
ager or factory director， and with the managers and directors being 
subject to the direct bureaucratic control of the relevant departmen“ 
tal administrative organs of the state government. The one-man 
management system， as centred in the person of the factory man-
ager or factory director， was adopted in the PRC as the basis for the 
political唾administrativecontrol of the means of industrial produc-
tion， and especially so in the heavy industrial sector. In this way， it
was ensured that， asthe modernization of industrial production bか
gan to place in the early 1950s， the large倫scale，strategic industrial 
SOEs that were then being established in the PRC would remain 
firmly within the political-administrative system and， there， remain 
subordinate to the central state四governmentaladministrative de晴
partments which directed， or commanded， their operation and func-
tioning. 
i. 1953・1956:the Consolidation of the Political Command 
Economic System 
The adoption in the PRC in the early 1950s of the form of central-
ized political command economic structure that had been estab“ 
lished in the Soviet Union very much went together with the estab-
lishing of the modern political-administrative system of the PRC. 
The central state-governmental command control structure for the 
industrial sector in the economic sphere was effectively established 
J¥ 
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by 1953， and thus one year before the formal establishing of the in-
stitutional structure of the system of government and political ad-
ministration in the PRC which came with the promulgation of the 
State Constitution in 1954. Even so， itshould be emphasized that 
the political勘administrativeinstitutions pertaining to the political 
command direction of the industrial SOEs actually pre-dated the 
promulgation of the State Constitution. Thus one of the first dか
partmental administrative organs relating to the centralized state-
governmental direction of the economic sphere， and indeed one of 
the first government departments founded in the PRC as such， was 
the Ministry of Labour under the Government Administrative 
Council， which was formally established in 1949. The Ministry of 
Labour included under it several sub-departments， which were con-
cerned with different matters to do with the industrial workers， 
such as occupational health and safety matters. 
The Government Administrative Council instructed the regional-
level government authorities in the PRC to give attention to the 
problems of industrial workers， with the result that by 1950 al 
regional甲levelgovernment authorities had established their own la-
bour departments. In addition， most of the Ministries under the 
Government Administrative Council with responsibilities for the 
heavy industrial sector established internal departments concerned 
with labour management， and with health and safety at work. Thus 
departments of this type were established， for example， in the Min-
istry of Heavy Industry and in the No. 1 and NO.2 Ministries for 
Machine Building. At the same time， the All China Federation of 
Trade Unions， which was established in June 1950， called on the 
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trade unions to establish labour protection departments at al the 
different levels of their organization. As a result， the internal trade 
union organizations that were formed in the industrial SOEs at 
once set up labour pr叫 ectioncommissions， inorder to monitor and 
improve the as then low standards of occupational health and safety 
for the industrial workers.I17J 
The system of political command control exercised by the cen・
tral state-governmental administrative departments over the indus-
trial SOEs determined the internal management organization of the 
industrial SOEs in the 1950s圃 Thedepartmental administrative or-
gans of the state government maintained centralized control over 
the industrial SOEs， since it was these organs that appointed the 
factory managers and factory directors who exercised responsibility 
for the industrial SOEs in accordance with the principles of the onか
man management system. The centralized control of the manage-
ment of the industrial SOEs went together with the centralized de-
partmental administrative control exercised by the state govern事
ment as regards the deployment of the industrial workforce， 
through the system of worker job-assignment. Under this system， 
individuals were formally assigned by the state to the various work 
units， and were allowed virtually no mobility as between the differ司
ent work units‘While the worker job-assignment system gave no 
recognition to the principle of freedom of labour， few workers com世
plained when they were assigned to the industrial SOEs. For the 
industrial SOEs received the bulk of the state-supplied capital in喝
vestment， and so were able to provide their employees with the best 
work conditions. 
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In the early 1950s， the administration of the centralized system 
of worker job-assignment was the responsibility of the Personnel 
Bureau of the CPC and the Ministry of Labour under the General 
Administrative Council. These two bodies， through the exercise of 
their job-明assignmentpowers， played a vital role in establishing the 
foundations of industrial production in the PRC， principally through 
their success in overcoming the problem of the acute shortages in 
technical personnel for the industrial SOEs. In 1953， itwas esti-
mated by the Party-State leadership that there were no more than 
about 3 million industrial workers employed in the manufacturing 
sectors， and that of these there were only about 300，000 with the 
technical training and qualifications essen七ialfor them to serve as 
administrative-managerial staf. The Personnel Bureau of the CPC 
and the Ministry of Labour were empowered to recruit technical 
personnel and to determine their work assignments， and， in the cir-
cumstances of shortages among the technical personnel， the two ad-
ministrative bodies used their job暢assignmentpowers to ensure the 
most efficient selective deployment of the available technical staf. 
Thus the Personnel Bureau of the CPC and the Ministry of Labour 
acted to assign almost al the technicians to the already established 
industrial centres of North-East China and the coastal cities， in0ト
der for them to take part in the modernization of the existing indus-町
trial enterprises. This application of the job-assignment system was 
critical， and it underlines how the job-assignment system stood as 
one of the main contributing factors in the development of the 
heavy industrial sector in the PRC in the 1950s. 
As was the case with the worker job-assignment system， the 
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system of one-man management that became established in the in-
dustrial SOEs was an important factor in the development of the 
heavy industrial sector in the PRC in the 1950s， inaccordance with 
the political command control structure as based in the central 
state鞠governmentaladministrative departments. It was a notable 
feature of the one-man management system， as practised in the 
1950s， that the selection and appointment of factoηmanagers and 
factory directors by the central state-governmental authorities were 
determined on the basis of the technical skill， experience and educa-
tional qualifications of the personnel， rather than on the basis of 
their political affiliations. lndeed， itwas not even required that the 
enterprise management officials should have membership of the 
CPC. The procedures for management-level appointments in the 
heavy industrial sector were， ther叶ore，highly meritocratic. The 
merit-based policy for management appointments was due primarily 
to the dearth of technicians， and technical1y trained workers， with 
the ability to apply proper technical expertise to the business of the 
management of the large-scale industrial SOEs which were in the 
forefront of the drive for industrial modernization. Certainly， the 
Party幽Stateleadership emphasized the importance of political edu-
cation for the norトPartyworkers and employees in the industrial 
SOEs. However， the Party-State leadership also called on the work-
ers and employees with CPC membership to learn from the non-
Party technical personnel， and to co師operatewith them in the event 
that they were appointed to leadership positions a白factorymanag-
ers or factory directors. The meritocratic ethos established for the 
management officials of the industrial SOEs would later be chal-
? ?
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lenged by Mao Zedong， but its presence in the early to middle 1950s 
was critical in founding the state-owned industrial sector in the 
PRC.181 
A further， and related， feature of the internal management or-
ganizational structure of the industrial SOEs during the 1950s was 
the presence of a clear role differentiation as between the three 
categories of officials who， as 1 have explained， were given standing 
and recognition within the overall enterprise management organiza-
tion. Thus there was a distinct differentiation in roles as between 
the secretaries acting for the CPC commit胎esthat were established 
in the industrial SOEs， the representatives of the industrial work-
ers' congresses and trade union organizations， and the managers or 
directors of the industrial SOEs in whose office were concentrated 
the administrative and operational powers relating to the enter-
prises in accordance with the system of on令manmanagement. 
There was considerable virtue in the managers and directors of 
the industrial SOEs holding a position that was distinct from that 
ofthe CPC 0出cial日， and from that of the representatives of the in-
dustrial workers. For the political command organizational control 
structure for the industrial SOEs in the PRC was such that the en‘ 
terprise managers and directors， incommon with their Soviet coun-
terparts， were required to be highly authoritarian in the execution 
of the industrial production plans that were handed down to them 
by the responsible central state-governmental administrative de-
partments. lndeed， fo1' the pu1'poses of the fulfilment of the state-
stipulated industrial p1'oduction plans， the enterprise manage1's and 
directo1's we1'e delegated ful powe1's to dist1'ibute the specific tasks 
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relating 旬 theindustrial plans to workshop or section heads more 
or less in accordance with their own will. Of course， itis true that 
under the terms of the existing trade union legislation， there was 
established a workers' participation system， where it was required 
that the production plans prescribed for the industrial SOEs were 
to be discussed with the workers and their representatives. Despite 
this， however， the managers and directors of the industrial SOEs 
stil had final power and authority to settle al operational matters 
relating to the execution of the industrial production plans， and so， 
for this reason， itwas essential for the efficient management of the 
industrial SOEs that the role and functions of the managers and di噌
rectors should be differentiated from those of the workers and the 
representatives of the workers. 
The one-man management system as it was applied in the 1950s 
was such that， inaddition to its conferring operational powers on 
the managers and directors in the industrial SOEs in relation to the 
industrial production plans， italso involved the enterprise manag-
ers and directors coming to exercise a decision由makingrole in the 
recruitment of industrial workers. Thus the enterprise managers 
and directors were authorized to make recommendations to the rele-
vant responsible state-governmental administrative departments， 
with respect to the categor旬sof workers that they required the 
Ministry of Labour to have assigned to them. Even so， this con幽
ceded right of recommendation did not quali(y the absolute control 
powers exercised by the Ministry of Labour as regards the general 
recruitment and assignment of the industrial workers， and even 
less the absolute control powers held by the Personnel Bureau of 
仁
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the CPC as regards senior-level appointments， 
The job-assignment system was to develop in the PRC in the 
early 1950s such that the centralized state-governmental authority 
over labour assignments， and the element of compulsion essential to 
the system， became more or less exclusive to deployments in the 
state-owned industrial and public service sectors， In August 1951， 
the Ministηof Labour issued instructions to the effect that labour 
departments at a1 levels of political administration in the PRC 
were required to strengthen their control of manpower deployments， 
These instructions were combined with the introduction of strict 
regulations prohibiting the movement of workers as between the 
different work units in the various sectors of employment， The 
problem that resulted from this regime of centralized labour deploy-
ment was that the central state-governmental direction of labour 
became unmanageable， since the system did not discriminate as be-
tween the different categories of 1vork unit and the different em-
ployment sectors， In consequence， rJl persons seeking work came to 
look to the state， and to the state蜘governmentalauthorities， topro-
vide employment. 
To resolve this problem， the Central Committee of the CPC in 
1953 adopted the advice of the CPC Commission for Labour and 
Elllployment， the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of the Inte-
rior， and directed that from that time forward the Ministry of La-
bour， and the subordinate labour departlllents， were to maintain 
the centralized system of job-assignlllent only in respect of man-
power deploYlllents in the industrial SOEs and in the industrial fac嗣
tories. As for worker recruitments in other elllployment sectors， 
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this was to take place on the basis of freedom of labour. Subse-
quently in 1955， the Central Committee of the CPC， inits Summary 
Report Concerning the Second Provincial and City Planning Meet-
ing， directed that from then on al government departments， at the 
different levels of political administration， were required to conform 
with the principle of centralized control of labour， and to recruit 
workers only in accordance with the labour plans that were incorpo-
rated within the framework of the national economic plans. Thus it 
was that through the Ministry of Labour al employment in the in-
dustrial SOEs， and in the government service， was brought under 
the direction of the central state-governmental authorities， as these 
acted in accordance with the principles of the political干command
form of economic organization.191 
The year 1953 witnessed not only the centralization of the job同
assignment system， but also the centralization of the government-
controlled system for wages and bonuses in the industrial SOEs. In 
the early 1950s， there was no centralized state-governmental con也
tr叫 ofwages， and the different regional-Ievel government authori帽
ties enjoyed considerable freedom in ecitablishing work-per合rmance-
related schemes for bonus payments. This situation changed in 
1953， when the Party-State leadership acted to establish a central-
ized wage system for the industrial SOEs that was based in state-
stipulated wage grades and graduated pay司scaledifferentials. At 
the same time， the PartyωState leadership acted to consolidate the 
bonus and reward schemes operating in the regions and localities 
within the framework of central state-governmental control. The 
various types of bonus that the central state-governmental authori-
じ
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ties stipulated were distributed among the workers and employees 
in the industrial SOEs in relation to work performance， asthis was 
assessed by the enterprise managers and directors acting through 
the one-man management system. ln this way， the centralized 
state-directed bonus system， allowing as it did for the discretion of 
enterprise managers and directors， came to constitute the main in-
centive structure for the industrial workers. As the Party-State 
leadership began to promote the virtues of economic self-reliance in 
the PRC， the centralized state-directed bonus system became ex-
panded， with generous bonuses and rewards being 0笠eredto the 
management officials， technical staff and workers in the industrial 
SOEs， inorder to encourage them to work competitively to make 
improvements in industrial production technology.!201 Thus it was 
that the central state-directed bonus system became closely bound 
up with the general policy of the Party-State leadership to promote 
technological development in industrial production.凶 l
By 1953， then， the industrial SOEs had been made subject to 
the system of political command control， as maintained by the ce任
tral state幽governmentalauthorities， with regard to the internal 
management organizational structure， the direction of industrial 
staff and workers， and the determination of wage and bonus differ-
entials. In the event， this central state司governmentalcontrol struc-
ture for the industrial SOEs was suppo凶edby the control structure 
正 forthe state-owned industrial sector that was specific to the CPC 
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organization. Here， the secretaries of the CPC committees estab-
lished in the industrial SOEs were crucial. When the system of po・
litical command economic direction was established in the PRC in 
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the early to middle 1950s， the role and functions of the CPC secre-
taries were quite clearly di佐 rentiatedfrom those belonging to the 
industrial management officials proper. In the main， the secretar幽
ies for the CPC committees had responsibilities for the supervision 
of relations among the enterprise employees， and for the implemerト
tation of CPC policies within the enterprises. Nevertheless， the 
CPC secretaries had no sp四ificresponsibilities for the administra-
tion and technical operation of the industrial SOEs， and hence no 
formal responsibilities for the enterprise production functions. 
These were responsibilities that fel to the enterprise managers and 
directors， inaccordance with the onかmanmanagement system. In 
consequence， the CPC secretaries were restricted to checking for 
abuses of power by enterprise management， to co-ordinating 
management-worker relations， and to imparting general political 
education to the enterprise employees. However， itshould be em-
phasized that if the CPC secretaries in the industrial SOEs were 
separated off in terms of role and function f凶mthe enterprise man-
agement， this was not entirely the case in respect of their standing 
relative to the industrial workers and the workers' representative 
bodies. For while the CPC secretaries were formally di偽rentiated
from the workers' trade union organizations established in the in副
dustrial SOEs in terms of role and functions， the CPC secretaries 
were stil able to act through the trade union organizations and so 
bring the industrial workers under their control and direction. 
Theむ・adeunion organizations in the industrial SOEs were the 
permanent bodies of the workers' congresses， and， as such， these 
?
?
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bodies played a crucial institutional role as the Party-State leader-
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ship moved to entrench the political command economic control 
structure， through the establishing of the welfare and social secu幽
rity infrastructure which became bound up with the industrial 
SOEs. In the early 1950s， the factory work conditions in the indus-
trial SOEs， in terms of occupational health and safety standards， 
fel far below the as then existing international norms. The Party曹
State leadership was anxious to ensure good conditions for the in-
dustrial workers， inorder to secure the support of the workers for 
the Party-State control of the industrial SOEs， and so it resolved to 
address the question of health and safety at work. Here， the Party-
State leadership relied on the trade union organizations in the in-
dustrial SOEs， and the CPC committees， tomobilize the workers to 
take part in health and safety campaigns， inorder to force the in-
dustrial management officials to improve working conditions. 
The result of this was that， by the middle 1950s， the Ministrγ 
of Labour and the subordinate labour departments， the State Coun-
cil Ministries with responsibilities for industrial matters， the All 
China Federation of Trade Unions and the Ministry of Health were 
working in close co-operation with the enterprise-Ievel trade union 
organizations in the area of occupational health and safety， and 
bringing out a large quantity of official standards and regulations 
relating to this.121 The elaboration of proper industrial health and 
safety standards was but one aspect of the welfare infrastructure 
that the Party-State leadership established for the industrial SOEs. 
For this welfare infrastructure extended to the provision of good 
quality housing and accommodation for the permanent industrial 
workers and their families， as well as to the provision of such social 
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and cultural amenities as theatres， sports grounds， communal baths 
and showers， canteens and dining rooms， communal kitchens， and 
reading rooms and librariesY"1 Hence the industrial SOEs came to 
function not just as units of economic production， but also as wel-
fare institutions for their employees， and， here， the trade union or目
ganizations functioned specitically to safeguard the welfare rights of 
the workers.12J 
The trade union organizations in the industrial SOEs worked in 
concert with the enterprise CPC committees， so that by 1953， atthe 
time of the centralization of state-governmental control over indus-
trial production， the trade union organizations were effectively the 
ancillary bodies of the CPC committees. This state of affairs was 
actively promoted by the Party司Stateleadership in the mobilization 
of the industrial workers. For the Party-8tate leadership depended 
strongly on the CPC committees and trade union organizations in 
the industrial 80Es， inorder to encourage the workers to partici-
pate fully in programmes for industrial enterprise development， and 
to supervise and monitor such worker participation. 80， for exam-
ple， one of the principal tasks assigned to the All China Federation 
of Trade Unions was to campaign for the fulfilment of the industrial 
production plans drawn up by the Party-8tate leadership， towhich 
end the Federation would issue letters and directives so as to mobi-
lize the industrial workers for the early completion of the state-
stipulated plans for national economic develoJ、ment.J251
From the very start of the PRC， the trade unions in the induト
trial 80Es， while in principle autonomous mass organizations， were 
subordinate to the organizational control structure of the CPC. 
? 、
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This is apparent from the terms of the Trade Union Law that was 
promulgated in June 1950， and from the appointment at that time 
of Liu Shaoqi as the President of the All China Federation of Trade 
Unions. The organizational structure of the trade unions was hier-
archic in form， and this made it possible for the CPC committees at 
the di偽 rentlevels of industrial organization to supervise the func-
tionings of the trade unions. According to the terms of the 1950 
Trade Union Law， alindustrial SOEs， and private enterprises and 
factories， were directed to establish representative workers' con-
gresses， with the trade union organizations acting as the permanent 
bodies of the workers' congresses. Through the control exercised by 
the CPC committees over the trade union organizations， the CPC 
was able to control the workers' congresses as such， and so in effect 
to ensure CPC control over the collective body of the industrial 
.1__ 1261 worKers. 
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The requirement laid down in the 1950 Trade Union Law， to
the effect that workers' congresses were to be established in the in-
dustrial SOEs， was intended to enhance the system of so-called 
democratic management， according to which the industrial workers 
were to be consulted by the enterprise management on al major is-
sues. However， the effective operationalization of centralized politi-
cal ∞mmand economic direction of the industrial SOEs， as of 1953， 
meant that the workers' trade union organizations in fact tended to 
downplay the principles of democratic management. Instead， the 
workers' trade union organizations came down strongly in favour of 
the policy of the Party-State leadership of establishing the one-man 
form of industrial management， asthis was based in the leadership 
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of the enterprise managers and directors and the 1'ewarding of 
workers according to work performance. 
It is true that the onゃmanmanagement system adopted fo1' the 
industrial SOEs in the ea1'ly 1950s gave effect to the principle of 
democratic management， in the respect that it involved the trade 
union o1'ganizations， as the permanent representative bodies of the 
wo1'kers' cong1'esses， and the CPC committees and ιheir secretaries 
having consultations with management. Thus the trade union 01'-
ganizations of the wo1'ke1's and the CPC committees in the indus崎
trial SOEs were entitled to receive and discuss the work reports 
drawn up by management concerning the enterprise plans relating 
to production， finance， technology and wages， and concerning the 
disposal of enterprise welfare funds. So also were the trade unions， 
and CPC committees， entitled to recommend to higher authorities 
that the enterprise leadership personnel should be disciplined 01' 
dismissed， ifthis was necessary. In these respects， the trade unions 
did indeed have some measure of independence from the manage-
ment personnel in the industrial SOEs. Nevertheless， the fact re-
mains that under the one-man management system， the trade uル
ions could only make recommendations， whereas real decision-
making powers in relation to the operations and production funひ
tions of the industrial SOEs rested with the enterprise managers 
and directors， and that this concentration of powers in the office of 
the managers and directors was veηr much ln line with the policy 
preferences of the Party-State leadership. 
As an indication of the acceptance of the one-man management 
system by the workers' trade union organizations in the industrial 
?、 」 、， ，
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SOEs， itshou1d be noted that， during the period when the system 
was in place， the trade unions worked closely with the central state-
governmental administrative departments responsible for industrial 
matters， particularly the Ministry of Labour， and with the Person-
nel Bureau of the CPC in establishing norms and standards of work 
discipline for the industrial enterprise workers. Here， the trade un-
ion organizations in the industrial SOEs acted to co幽ordinatetheir 
activities， and those of the workers， in accordance with the require-
ments of the state幽governmentaladministrative departments which 
were responsible for the handing down of the industrial production 
plans to the enterprises fo1' implementation. Thus the enterprise 
managers would consult with the workers' rep1'esentatives in the 
trade unions， afte1' receiving the industrial production plans from 
the administrative departments of the state government. After the 
consultation， however， itwas left to the enterprise managers to dis-
tribute at their own discretion the 7a1'ious work暢loadassignments to 
the subordinate heads of the diff81 ，mt wo1'k sections in the enter帽
??
prises， and then to con日ultwith the section heads in the evaluation 
of worke1' perfo1'mance. This one→国ち managementsystem fo1' work 
discipline evaluation proved suceussful in bringing the trade union 
o1'ganizations into a close co-operative 1'elationship with the indus-
t1'ial management， and with this 1'esulting in a significant imp1'ove-
ment in the perfo1'mance of the wo1'kers in the indust1'ial SOEs. Irト
deed， the system was such that， inkeeping with the technocratic 
ethos of onゃmanindustrial management， the trade union organiza-
tions in the indust1'ial SOEs even began to acquire a certain limited 
independence from the enterprise CPC committee o1'ganizations. 
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The area of the life of the industrial SOEs where the trade un-
ion organizations we陀 moststrenuously involved in the 1950s was 
that of the welfare and social security infrastructure that the state-
governmental authorities established for the industrial enterprises. 
τ'he industrial SOEs were designated as government work units， 
and， inconsequence of this， the welfare and social security benefits 
that were guaranteed to the industrial workers were veηT generous， 
as relative to the benefits for contract labourers and part-time 
workers. The social security system that was established for the 
workers in the industrial SOEs was comprehensive， and based in 
the principle of cradle-to-grave provision. This was回 becausethe 
centralized job-assignment system provided that the unionized 
workers who were assigned to industrial SOEs were to hold their 
positions until their deaths， and hence on a fully permanent basis， 
田ldwith an effective prohibition on their movement between work 
units and on resignations from the same. The problem， with this， 
was that since the terms and conditions for permanent worker em-
ployment in the industrial SOEs were so favourable and the central 
state government opposed job mobility and resignations from posi-
tions， the industrial SOEs had by 1956 become seriously over-
staffed， and with about 90 percent of the workforce having perma-
nent status and being in receipt of the ful range of welfare and so・
cial security benefits. To make matters worse， the State Council in 
1957 ratified proposals of the Ministry of Labour that there should 
be a total ban on resignations by workers and employees in the gov-
ernment departments， the government research institutes and the 
industrial SOES.1271 
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While the total ban on resignations worked to consolidate the 
control of the central state-governmental authorities over the rela-
tively scarce technical staff， itdid at the same time lead to a signifi-
cant increase in the overall numbers of permanent， and unionized， 
staff and workers in the industrial SOEs， and hence also to a sig-
nificant increase in the burden on the state-maintained welfare and 
social security infrastructure. Indeed by 1957， the medium-sized in-
dustrial SOEs were each employing between 5，000 to 10，000 staff 
and workers， and the large-scale industrial SOEs between 150，000 
to 250，000 staff and workers. As if in anticipation of the expansion 
in the numbers of workers permanently employed in the industrial 
SOEs that would follow from the 1957 ban on job resignations， the 
central state-governmentaI authorities had begun in 1956 to advo-
cate a modified system for state industrial sector emp10yment. Thus 
the Ministry of Labour proposed that the centralized state-
governmental system of permanent job assignments， and the cradle酬
to-grave social security system that went with it， should be reserved 
for only the technical staff and skilled workers in the industrial 
SOEs. For the unskilled and ordinary workers， there were to be 
two alternative employment schemes. One was to be the contract 
labour system， where the workers were to sign limited contracts 
and to receive on1y some of the social security benefits accorded ω 
the permanent workers. The other form of employment was to be 
for the temporary workers. These wereωbe paid for piece work， in
conformity with the fixed part-time pay rates， and to receive no 
benefits other than their basic piece work wages.1剖IIn accordance 
with the terms of this reformed employment scheme， the State 
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Council issued re伊 lationsfor the reform of the system of wages， 
which effectively strengthened the principle of wage differentiaIs.'291 
The principle of selectivity proposed by the Ministry of Labour 
in respect of the provision of social security benefits for the perma-
nent， and unionized， technical staff and skilled workers in the in-
dustrial SOEs exposed serious political flaws in the organization of 
the sta胞 sectorin industrial production. For when the new employ-
ment system was put into practice， itprovoked widespread discon-
tent among the ordinary and unskilled industrial workers who 
found themselves in the category of contract workers. The contract 
workers， and part-time workers， were denied permanent status and 
proper social security benefits， and were left more or less unpro-
tected by trade union organizations. In consequence， these workers 
began to criticize the industrial management 0田cialsand the CPC 
committee officials in the industrial enterprises for elitism and 
authoritarianism. In doing so， the disa偽ctedindustrial workers 
helped initia胎 themovement for the politics of mass participation 
that Mao Zedong was to put himself at the head of， and that was to 
result in the undermining of the internal organizational structure of 
the industrial SOEs， which took place in the era of the Great Leap 
Forward and the era of the Cultural Revolution. 
ii. 1956・1978:the CPC Committee Leadership System， and 
the Internal Organizational Structure of the Industrial 
SOEs during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural 
Revolution 
The centralized political command control structure for the indus-
ムノ、
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trial SOEs in the PRC， asthis was consolidated between 1953 and 
1956， proved to be largely a success in terms of economic perform-
ance， and to point towards a favourable future for national indus-
trial production. The centralized system for job assignments and 
for wages and bonuses operated effectively， and this accorded well 
with the overall system of centralized industrial production plan-
ning as based in the departmental administrative organs of the 
State Council. The success of centralized planning in industrial 
production was very much bound up with the internal organiza-
tional structure of the industrial SOEs， and crucial， here， was the 
one-man management system that the Party-State leadership estab-
lished as the foundational element in the system of political com-
mand economic direction. The concentration of decision-making 
powers in the office of the managers and directors of the industrial 
SOEs， as this was essential to the one-man management system， 
provided an institutional context for the e賀町tiveco-ordination of 
the efforts of the industrial workers through their trade union rep-
resentatives， and so provided the basis for the effective implementa-
tion of the central state government-stipulated industrial production 
pl組 sat the level of the enterprises. At the same time， the one-
man management system served to ensure that decision-making 
powers in the industrial SOEs would be exercised by management 
officials who possessed a high level of technical training and exper-
六 tise，and who， on account of this， enjoyed proper differentiation in 
role， functions and powers 企omthe trade union representatives of 
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the workers， and from the CPC committee secretaries， within the 
internal organizational structure of the industrial SOEs. Given this， 
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t would appear that the industrial SOEs in the PRC， as of 1956， 
were set fair to make large advances in industrial development and 
lllodernization， and in accordance with the ruling technocratic旬
managerialist ethos favou1'ed by the Pa1'ty-State leade1'ship. 
1n the event， the cent1'a1ized political command control st1'uc冒
tu1'e fo1' the indust1'ial SOEs， as of the mid-1950s， p1'oved to be un-
stab1e and vulnerable. In part， this was due to deficiencies in the 
system of government and political administration‘It was so also 
for reasons that we1'e to do with the internal management organiza-
tion of the industrial SOEs as this had evolved by 1956， and here， 
mo1'e pa1'ticularly， for reasons to do with the specifically political di-
mension of this internal organizational st1'ucture. The basic p1'ob-
1em was that the technocratic“manageria1ist ethos encouraged by 
the Party-State 1eadership fo1' the management official臼 ofthe in-
dust1'ial SOEs was， insome 1'espects， at odds with the strict ega1i-
ta1'ianism implicit in the socialist ideology espoused by the CPC. At 
any rate， the ethos of technoc1'atic-manage1'ialism， and the diffe1'en-
tiation of the management officials f1'om the CPC officials and the 
indust1'ial ente1'p1'ise worke1's， p1'ompted the accusations of authori-
ta1'ianism， bu1'eauc1'atism and elitism that came to be levelled 
against the management officials in the indust1'ial SOEs， and that 
served to exp1'ess the sense of the gene1'al social and political divi-
siveness of the p1'evailing ente1'p1'ise management system which 
came to be fo1'med among significant g1'oups within state and soci-
ety. 
? ? ?
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The divisiveness that came to be associated with the industrial 
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lined by the inequalities opened up in society through the differenti-
ated wage and bonus system that the Party-State leadership estab-
lished for the staff and workers in the industrial SOEs. A further， 
and even more crucial， factor making for social divisions was to do 
with the privileges accruing to the industrial SOEs through the wel-
fare and social security infrastructure established for them. This 
infrastructure served to create entrenched interests among the per-
manent industrial workers， and among their representative trade 
union organizations. ln the circumstances of the mid-1950s， the en・
trenching of the welfare rights of the permanent industrial workers 
served to divide off the industrial workers from other categories of 
workers. Moreover， this， inpotential at least， served to create con-
ditions where the workers and their trade union representatives 
would oppose management in the event that opposition was essen-
tial for the defence of their welfare and social security privileges. 
With al of this， there was much scope for the undermining of the 
internal management organization of the industrial SOEs. ln al 
probability， the industrial SOEs in the PRC would have overcome 
the problems bound up with the politics of their internal organiza-
tional structure had the consensus in favour of centralized political 
command direction of industrial production proved enduring. How-
ever， this was not to be the case， and the internal organizational 
structure of the industrial SOEs soon came to be transformed in fa-
vour of CPC control， and this in the name of the ideological doc-
trines espoused by Mao Zedong. 
As 1 have explained， the centralized political command eco・
nomic system that the Party-State leadership established in the 
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PRC in the ear1y 1950s was model1ed on the system adopted in the 
Soviet Union. The deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations that oc幽
curred in 1956 provided Mao Zedong， and his supporters， with the 
oppo此unity加 criticizewhat they saw as an excessive adherence to 
Soviet-style economics and political administration. The one-man 
management system， as practised in the industrial SOEs， was 
picked out for special criticism， and it wa自condemnedfor being bu-
reaucratic and authoritarian， for being unsuited to the particular 
social and political conditions of the PRC， and for being the cause of 
the alienation of the CPC from the masses and the workers. 
At the 8th National Congress of the CPC in September 1956， it
was announced that the one-man management system was to be 
abandoned，制ldto be replaced with an industrial management sys蝿
tem that was ref込町edto as the management system with the party 
committee at its core. In his Political Work Report to the Congress， 
Liu Shaoqi advocated the establishing of a factOIγdirectory respon-
sibility system， where ultimate leadership in the enterprises was to 
be vested not in managers and directors， but in the CPC committees， 
which were to act to subordinate the managers and directors to 
their own control. Thus the CPC was to play the central role in in帽
dustrial management， and， topromote this， Liu Shaoqi called on 
the CPC committee organizations in the industrial SOEs to work to 
establish an internal m削減gementorganizational structure for the 
enterprises which would be based in the direct involvement of the 
workers， and in the active participation of the masses. At the. time 
of the 8th National Congress of the CPC， the moment was impend-
ing for the decentralization of decision-making powers from the cen-
?
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tral to the local levels of government and political administration 
which was to take place in the late 1950s. Very much in line with 
this coming trend towards political decentralization， Liu 8haoqi 
called for the central state回governmentaladministrative depart-
ments with responsibilities for economic and industrial affairs to re働
lax their political.嶋administrativehold on the industrial 80Es， tothe 
end that operational powers should be decentralized加 theindus-
trial enterprise management as this was to be based in the leader-
ship of the CPC committees. 80 it was that， in1956， the national 
priorities of increased industrial production and rapid economic 
growth were seen as requiring political-administrative decentraliza-
tion， and the adoption within the industrial 80Es of a factory di向か
tor responsibility system based in the participation of the masses 
and the workers， and in the control of the enterprise management 
officials through the institution of the CPC committees.lOI 
In accordance with the terms of the industrial management 
proposals set out at the 8th Natinnal Congress of the CPC， there 
took place the curtailment of the operational powers of the manag-
ers and directors in the industrial 80Es and their subordination to 
the supervisory control of the CPC committee secretaries. The 
downgrading of the enterprise management elites went together 
with the decentralization of certain of the state-governmental 
decision-making powers which had been integral to the political 
cOlllmand control structure fo1' industrial production. 80， for exalll-
ple， the central state.‘governlllental administrative departments 
with responsibilities for industrial lllatters were stripped of their 
powers with respect to the determination of the industrial produc帽
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tion plans for the industrial SOEs. At the same time， the Ministry 
of Labour was stripped of its powers regarding centralized job儲-
signments within the仕ameworkof the national industrial planning 
system. Thus in July 1956， the job-assignment powers were decen-
tralized to the local govemment authorities. This took place at pre-
cisely the time when the Party-State leadership w邸 exploringways 
and means of cutting enterprise costs through reducing manpower 
levels， and through curbing spending on出esocial security benefits 
which were provided by. the industrial SOEs for血epermanent 
workers. In the event， the decentralization of the job-assignment 
system ran entirely against the objective of cost叩 ttingin the state 
industrial sector， since it resulted in the blind mass recruitment of 
workers for the industrial SOEs金官nthe rural areas at the direc-
tion of the local govemments. 
There were some members of the Party-State leadership who， 
following the 8th National Congress of the CPC， continued to advo-
ca随 theone-man management system for the industrial SOEs，阻d
to insist that the efficient management of the industrial SOEs de・
manded the appointment of management 0伍cialswith technical ex-
pertise and experience in industrial administration. However， this 
opposition 初出enew industrial policy had litle e偽 ct，given that， 
as events unfolded， alforms of the division of labour based in加ch-
nical and educational criteria came旬 bedenounced as elitist and 
formalist with the initiation in 1958 of the policy of the Great Leap 
Forward. 
For the industrial SOEs， the Great Leap Forward w田 adisas-
ter， just as it was for al aspects of state and society in the PRC. 
? ?
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When the Great Leap Forward was initiated， the local government 
authorities were. instructed to develop self-su任icientindustrial sys司
tems in their own localities， and so， tofurther this， the industrial 
SOEs were placed under the direct control of the local government 
authorities in whose jurisdictional areas they were situated. This 
resulteq in alf increase in the levels of over~manning in the indus-
trial SOEs， particularly so in the large-sized industrial SOEs. It re-
sulted a1so in the marked decline in agricultural production relative 
to industrial production that. so characterized the Great Leap For-
ward， as local governments began to recruit unskilled workers 合om
the rural areas for the industrial enterprises. The outcome of this 
was famine in the countryside， coupled with dramatic increases in 
the levels of local government spending on wages and welfare bene-
fits for the industrial workers.131 
官leinternal organizational structure of the industrial SOEs 
that had been developed during the early to middle years of the 
1950s was effectively destroyed with the Great Leap Forward. The 
one岨manmanagement system， based in the office of the managers 
and directors， was abandoned， and. al management leadership in 
the industrial SOEs was made subject ωthe control of the CPC 
committee. secretaries. At the same time， the system of structured 
wage differentials and work performance-related bonuses for the in-
dustrial workers was ended， as was the parallel system for calculat幽
ing the pensions， and other welfare and social security benefits， of
the permanent industrial workers. The guiding principle of these 
changes to the internal organizational structure of the industrial 
SOEs was provided by the ideology of anti-elitism， anti-
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authoritarianism and anti-technocratic-managerialism propagated 
by Mao Zedong. The outcome of the changes w邸 notonly an Inter-
nal organizational structure for the industrial SOEs that w拙 based
in the power of the CPC committee secretaries. More strongly， 
there was established a radical politicization of the industrial SOEs， 
as the industrial workers were required to attend political propa-
ganda classes under the auspices of the CPC secretaries， and a radi-
cal egalitarianism in the working practices in the industrial SOEs， 
as al hierarchic distinctions among enterprise staff and workers 
were obliterated. 
By the time that the consequences of the Great Leap Forward 
were fully evaluated by the Party-State leadership in 1961， such 
problems with the industrial SOEs as unqualified workers and over-
manning had become acute. Thus it was that at the Central Party 
Work Conference convened at Lushan in Au伊 st1961， the Party-
State leadership discussed and prepared concrete proposals for the 
re-establishing of the internal work norms for the industrial SOEs 
that had been followed prior to the Great Leap Forward. The result 
of this was that on 16 September 1961， the Central Committee of 
the CPC issued the Draft Regulations for the Work of the lndustrial 
SOEs. Here， itwas laid down， among other things， that the indus-
trial SOEs were to establish the factory director responsibility sys-
tem at each level of industrial production，' and 80 restore the 
authority of the enterprise management 0伍cials. Also， the indus-
trial SOEs were directed to establish strict technology evaluation 
norms， and finance and accounting norms， for adoption by the e任
terp討semanagement. ln a marked departure貨明nthe Maoist doc-
五
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trines of the Great Leap Forward， the Draft Regulations stipulated 
that the principles of the division of labour were to be adopted for 
the organization of the workers， and that a system for bonus pay-
ments based in the performance of workers should be instituted. It 
was also emphasized that the workers' congresses and trade union 
bodies were important components of the intemal management or輔
ganizational structure of the industrial SOES.132 1n keeping with the 
spirit of the Draft Regulations， the centralized system of job assign-
ment for the industrial SOEs was restored and strengthened. The 
Ministry of Labour was given powers to plan for reductions in the 
numbers of workers in the industrial SOEs， in order to cut costs 
and to promote efficiency. 1n addition， there were arrangements set 
in place by which industrial workers who had been recruited from 
the rural areas， and who were unqualified and surplus， were to be 
returned to the rural localities subject to the allocation of proper 
compensation.13 
The principles set out in the Draft Regulations for the Work of 
the Industrial SOEs， as issued by the Central Committee of the 
CPC， formed an integral part of the general programme for eco・
nomic reform that was promoted by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping， 
and， assuch， they were given formal legal e貸ect.The State Council 
issued its Regulations on the Work of the 1ndustrial SOEs in Sep-
tember 1961， which Regulations were drawn up by Deng Xiaoping 
and became known as the 70 1ndustrial Regulations.I~41 1n addition， 
there were important Regulations issued by the State Council that 
reflected the determination of the Party-State leadership to restore 
some measure of differentiation between permanent workers， con・
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tract workers and part-time workers， in order to reduce expendi-
tures on welfare and social security benefits， tostrengthen the in・
centive structure for workers， and to improve overall labour produc司
tivity.1351 
The legal effect given to the principles of economic reform ar-
gued for by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping underline something of 
the restoration of central state-governmental powers generally， and 
in relation to the economic sphere in particular， which took place 
following the Great Leap Forward. However， the thrust of the eco骨
nomic reforms and political recentralization of the early 1960s was 
opposed by ]¥:1ao Zedong and his supporters， and was destined to be 
reversed with the Cultural Revolution. This was so not -least with 
respect to the industrial SOEs. By 1966， the efforts of the Party-
State leadership to recentralize the powers of the state-
governmental industrial administrative departments， tore-establish 
the factory director responsibility system， the centralized job-
assignment system and the aηangements for contract workers and 
part-time workers， and to reduce welfare and social security costs in 
the industrial SOEs had provoked severe criticism and opposition 
from among those who were sympathetic to Mao Zedong. As創 1in幽
dication of this， there is the Joint Circular issued in November 1966 
by the AlI China Federation of Trade Unions and the Ministry of 
Labour， which， among other things， included a condemnation of the 
system of using different classifications for the various categories of 
workers in the industrial SOEs as a form of capitalist exploitation， 
together with a cal for the industrial SOEs to restore permanent 
employment status to the former workers who had been sent back 
五
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to the rural areas.1描l
On 8 August 1966， Mao Zedong announced his Sixteen Points 
through the Decision of the 11th Plenum of the 8th Central Com-
mittee of the CPC， and so initiated the Cultural Revolution.t871 In 
the Sixteen Points， Mao proclaimed that the institutional organs of 
the Cultural Revolution were to be the Cultural Revolution Leader-
ship Group， and， under this， the cultural revolutionary committees 
and cultural revolutionaη∞ngresses. These organs， espeCial1y the 
cultural revolutionary committees， were 加 playa decisive role in 
the internal organizational structure of the industrial SOEs during 
the Cultural Revolution， particularly so in mobilizing the industrial 
workers against the established organizational. control structures in 
the industrial SOEs. Thus it was that仕'omAu♂1St to September 
1966， the functions of the trade union organizations， and those of 
the workers' congresses and the enterprise CPC committees， began 
to be taken over by the cultural revolutionary committees. As the 
Cultural Revolution developed， the cultural revolutionary comIlit-
tees moved to organize the industrial workers， particularly the dis-
affected workers who had been most opposed to the industrial re-
forms introduced following the Lushan Conference. The form of en-
terprise leadership system provided by the cultura1 revolutionary 
committees involved a continuation of the politicization and egali-
tarianism of the era of the Great Leap Forward in respect of the in-
ternal management organization of the industrial SOEs， save that 
the politicization and egalitarianism practised in the industrial 
SOEs during the Cultural Revolution went even further than it had 
been the case with the Great Leap Forward. For the industrial 
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workers who organized under the cultural revolutionary committees 
opposed themselves not only to the elite skilled unionized workers 
and management 0質icialsof the industrial 80Es with permanent 
status， but also to the regular CPC committee secretaries who had 
been actively engaged in industrial management during the Great 
Leap Forward as a consequence of the decentralization policies 
adopted at that time. 
The industrial workers who followed the leadership of the cul-
tural revolutionary committees were so politicized that management 
decisions regarding the industrial 80Es became less to do with 
technical considerations of production e伍ciency，and more to do 
with political considerations relating to the doctrinal orthodoxies 
contained in the teachings of Mao Zedong. The egalitarianism that 
出eindustrial workers espoused was a revolutionary egalitarianism 
that went against al rationalization of the division of labour. The 
permanent skilled workers with high wages and welfare privileges， 
the industrial management personnel， and the regular CPC commit-
tee secretaries were al subjected to severe victimization， and then 
sent to the rural areas to perform manuallabour， with企equentpe-
riods of incarceration in labour reform camps. The unskilled work-
ers who had earlier been returned to the rural localities were 
brought back to the industrial SOEs， assigned their former posi-
tions， and granted generous material compensation. The central 
state-govemmental au出oritiesendeavoured ωmaintain some sense 
ofpropo此ionin enterprise employment policy. 80， for e玄ample，the 
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Federation of Trade Unions and the Ministry of Labour of Novenト
ber 1966 where the industrial SOEs had been cal1ed on to reinstate 
the displaced unskilled workers from the countryside. However， 
these directives were consistently disregarded by the cultural revo-
lutionary committees， with the result that in October 1971 the 
State Council was forced to issue a directive that provided for the 
g:r羽ltingof permanent worker status to the temporary workers in 
the industrial SOEs. This measure ensured equality among enter-
prise workers， but it did so only at the immense economic co自tof an 
immediate increase of 8 million in the numbers of permanent work-
ers who were employed in the state industrial sector.!381 
The Cultural Revolution was a watershed in the development of 
the industrial SOEs in the PRC. For the Cultural Revolution effec-
tively marked the end of the centralized political command organ-
izational control structure for industrial production in the form in 
which the Party噌Stateleadership had adopted it from the Soviet 
Union in the early 1950s. In putting an end to the political com-
mand economic system， the Cultural Revolution also destroyed the 
internal organizational structure that the Party-State leadership 
had endeavoured to establish for the industrial SOEs in the early 
1950s， and had subsequently endeavoured to re困establishin the 
early 1960s after the Great Leap Forward. The factory director re-
sponsibility system， as based in the principle of one-man manage-、
ment， was abandoned in favour of leadership based in mass worker 
participation， and， in consequence of this， the entire ethos of 
technocratic噌managerialismin the state industrial sector was dis-
credited. The established workers' trade union organizations in the 
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industrial SOEs， and the regular CPC committees， were under-
mined， with this leading to sound democratic management for the 
enterprises being superseded by the anarchy of the cultural revolu“ 
tionary committees. In addition， the egalitarian politics of the Cul喧
tural Revolution meant the demise of the centralized job-
assignment scheme for the direction of industl'ial labour， and the 
demise also of the system of di笠泊官ltiatedwages and bonuses for 
the enterprise workers. These practices were elitist and divisive， 
and， whatever their justification in terms of pure economic logic， 
they were to be condemned as counter-revolutionary. In al， then， 
the impact of the Cultural Revolution on the industrial sector in the 
PRC， and， more particularlyヲonthe internal management organiza-
tion of the industrial SOEs， was disastrous， and this disaster com-
pounded， atthe level of the means of industrial production， the dis-
aster that the Cultural Revolution represented in terms of the un-
dermining of the institutions of central state government and politi-
cal administration. 
iv. 1978-1986: the Reform of tht) Internal Organizational 
Structure of the Industrial SOEs 
The 3rd Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC in Dか
cember 1978 marked the end of the Cultural Revolution， and the 
start of the era of economic reform. The legacy of the Cultural 
Revolution where the state of industrial production was concerned 
was， of course， the parlous condition of the industrial SOEs. The 
attempt to base political command economic direction over the in-
dustrial SOEs in the practice of mass worker participation， and in 
?????
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the institution of the cultural revolutionary committees， had served 
only to transform the industrial SOEs into inefficient and unproduc-
tive work units which remained a drain on the already stret沼hedre-
sources of the state. The management elites had been degraded， 
with the consequence that there was no longer present any tradi-
tion of advanced technical expertise in enterprise administration 
and production operations. There was a chronic shortage of capital 
investment funding for what was the long overdue upgrading of en-
terprise technology. Wages and bonuses were not related to worker 
productivity， and reflected no rational division of labour within the 
internal organizational structure of the industrial SOEs. The eco・
nomic costs to the state involved in the maintenance of the indus-
trial SOEs were enormous， given that the state had to underwrite 
wages and bonuses， and the bloated welfare and social security in帽
frastructure which supported the industrial workers and which had 
expanded massively during the Cultural Revolution. The costs that 
the state incurred with the heavy subsidies that it had to pay out to 
the industrial SOEs were hugely exaggerated on account of the 
problem of chronic over柑manning. For the state-sector industrial 
workforce had continued to grow in the period of the Cultural Revo-
lution， such that by 1978 it was estimated that the permanent 
workers in the industrial SOEs alone， asopposed to contract work-
ers， comprised some 68 million persons， and with this representing 
an increase of 119 percent from the year 1965.1391 
By the mid-1970s， the Party-State leadership in the PRC had 
begun to give serious consideration to the problem of the industrial 
SOEs. An important moment in this process came in July 1975， 
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when the Prime Minister Zhou Enlai was taken il， and Deng Xi-
aoping assumed responsibility for the ordinary business of the State 
Council and the Central Committee of the CPC. Deng commis-
sioned a series of special work conferences to study existing eco輔
nomic conditions， while the Sta白 Councilbegan the task of re-
establishing some measure of central state-governmental control 
over the industrial SOEs. At this stage， the Party-State authorities 
were advocating a retum to the system of industrial production and 
management that had been in place prior to the Great Leap For-
ward， where the industrial SOEs would be subject to the classic 
form of centralized political command economic direction.1401 
The attempt to re-establish central state嶋governmentalcontrol 
over industrial production came under attack in November 1975， 
and， as a consequence of this， Deng Xiaoping was stripped of his 
government and CPC positions and branded as a counter-
revolutionary. Following the death of Mao Zedong in September 
1976 and the arrest of the Gang of Four a month later， the way was 
clear for Hua Guofeng， the successor to Mao as Chairman of the 
CPC，加 promotethe rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping. This， inturn， 
paved the way for Deng Xiaoping to act decisively in the formation 
of the reformist Party-State leadership elite， as this then moved to 
address the fundamental political and economic problems of the 
PRC at the 3rd Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC 
in December 1978. 
The post-1978 Party-State leadership was greatly concerned 
??
with economic reform， and central to this concern was reform of the 
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trial SOEs was to involve the transformation of the industrial SOEs 
合ompolitical-administrative units 印刷ectto political command di-
rection into production units with independent standing in law， and， 
later， Into corpora也 personentities which were for羽 allyestablished 
under law. To e晶 ctreform of the industrial SOEs， the Party-State 
leadership had to address a basic problem that had arisen as the 
consequence of the establishing of the political command organiza-
tional structure for the industrial SOEs. This was the problem of 
the concentration of economic decision-mak.ing powers in the state-
governmental administrative departments， and particular匂 sothe 
decision-mak.ing powers relating to the possession， use and disposal 
of the capital and assets of the industrial SOES.[4I1 In response to 
this problem， the State Council issued on 13 July 1979 five land-
mark regulations that provided for the delegation of certain key 
decision-making powers to the industrial SOEs， including powers 
relating to the retention of enterprise profiω， and also， and in con-
sequence of this， powers for the limited curbing of intervention by 
the departmental administrative organs of the central state govern-
ment.[拙1Following this， the State Council proceeded further with 
the decentralization of economic decision-making powers to the in-
dustrial SOEs， through the issuing of a notice that called on al 
state-governmental administrative departments， and al local gov-
ernment authorities， toselect certain industrial SOEs as test sites 
for the trial implementation of the delegated decision-mak.ing pow同
ers as stipulated in the five regulations of July 1979.[431 
A second problem that the Party-State leadership had to ad-
dress in 1978 in regard to the industrial SOEs was the absenωofa 
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atable intemal organizational structure for the management of the 
industrial SOEs， and the assumption of management functions 
within the industrial SOEs by the officials of the CPC committees. 
This problem had become particularly serious during the Cultural 
Revolution， on account of the activities of the cultural revolutionary 
committees within the enterprises， although it was a problem that 
was inherent in the political command economic s玄stemas it had 
developed in the PRC generally. The response of the Party-State 
leadership to this problem after 1978 was to introduce a system of 
management for the industrial SOEs where the enterprise manag-
ers and directors， the CPC committee secretaries and the represen-
tatives of the enterprise workers were assigned separate and dis-
tinct， yet complementary， roles， functions and powers within the in-
t泡malorganizational structure of the industrial SOEs. The pro-
jected intemal management organizational structure for the indus-
trial SOEs was to receive a formal statement in the 1988 Enterprise 
Law， and比wasin some respects to provide the basis for the frame-
work institutions of corporate governance for the industrial SOEs 
that were specified in the 1993 Corporation Law. 官ledetailed dis-
cussion of the principles of the intemal management organizational 
structure for the industrial SOEs set out in the Enterprise Law， 
and in the Corporation Law， issomething that 1 leave for another 
occasion. For the purposes of the present paper， 1 shall state briefly 
the steps taken by the Party輸Stateleadership， inthe period prior to 
the Enterprise Law of 1988，加 establishwhat was an intemal or-
ganizational structure for the management of the industrial SOEs 
that was based in the delegation of operational powers to the enter-
?????
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prise managers and directors， and to the relative exclusion of the 
CPC committee secretaries. 
At the time when the Party-State leadership began with reform 
of the internal management organization of the industrial SOEs， 
the CPC committee secretaries and the industrial workers and their 
representatives were the principal contenders for the enterprise 
managerial leadership position. 1n consequence， the CPC commit-
tees and the secretaries， and the workers and their representatives， 
stood as powerful interest constituencies that were， inprinciple， op-
posed to the efforts of the Party-State leadership to transfer opera幽
tional decision-making powers to the enterprise managers and di-
rectors as part of the reform of the enterprise management struc-
ture. Given these constituencies， itwas inevitable that the Party-
State leadership should have elected to estab1ish an internal man-
agement system for the industria1 SOEs that was to involve the 
joint participation of the management officials， the CPC committee 
secretaries and the representatives of the industrial workers， but 
subject to a clear differentiation in r01e， functions and powers as be-
tween them and subject to a clear leadership bias in favour of the 
management officials. The internal management system that was 
established was the form of factory director responsibility system 
where the enterprise managers and directors were identified as the 
bearers of operational powers in respect of the industrial SOEs. 
This system was to be strongly opposed by the CPC committee sec-
retaries. For the CPC secretaries had from the beginning of indus-
trialization in the PRC always resented subordination to the techni-
cal managerial personnel， and they had from 1956 onwards suc-
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ceeded in subjecting the management staff and the workers' trade 
union organizations in the industrial SOEs加 theirown leadership. 
Despite the revolutionary committees and the mass worker partici-
pation of the Cultural Revolution era， the CPC committee 0伍cials
in the industrial SOEs had in fact retained much of their power and 
influence， and they were not prepared to surrender this as the re-
form period began. 
τ'he post-1978 reformist Party-State leadership faced a major 
difficulty regarding enterprise internal management reorganization， 
which arose from the resistance to change of the CPC committee 
secretaries. On the one hand， itwas clear that CPC institutions 
and organizational power had to be restored in the aftermath of the 
Cultural Revolution， and that this pointed towards a meeting of the 
demands of the CPC secretaries. On the other hand， itwas equally 
clear that the industrial SOEs had suffered enormous damage on 
account of the appropriation of management functions by politicized 
CPC officials， especially during the Cultural Revolution， and that 
this pointed towards the restoration of the leadership status of the 
enterprise management 0館cials. To overcome this difficulty， the 
Party-State leadership proposed that the factory director responsi-
bility system， where decision-making powers were held by the en-
terprise management officials， would form the basis of the internal 
organizational structure for the industrial SOEs. However， itwas 
also emphasized that the factory director responsibility system 
would give effect to principles of democratic management that pro-
vided for the industrial workers， and their representatives in the 
workers' congresses and trade union organizations， having a consul-
問
127 
The lnternal Organizational Structure of the lndustrial State-Owned 
Enterprises in the Peopl邑冶 Republicof China: 1949-1986 (Covel) 
tative role in production planning and general operations in the in-
dustria1 SOEs. At the same time， itwas insisted， inorder to satisちr
the CPC secretaries， that the factory director responsibi1ity system 
and the democratic management system of the workers' congresses， 
as these were in operation in the industrial SOEs， would be p1aced 
under the organizational leadership of the CPC committees. While 
this arrangement appeared to confer leadership status on the CPC 
secretaries， inpractice this was not so. For the management ofi-
cials， the workersラcongressesand CPC secretaries were re1ated to 
one another within the enterprise organizationa1 structure in accor-
dance with the principle of 1'ole differentiation， and the leadership 
ro1e assigned to the CPC sec1'eta1'Ies was a superviso1'Y 1'ole that left 
unqualified the absolutism of the ope1'ational powers which were 
delegated to the enterprise managers and directors. 
The Party-State leadership moved early in the reform period to 
develop a new internal organizational structure for the industrial 
SOEs. In March 1979， the state gれvernmentestablished the China 
Association for Enterprise Man:三洋ment，in order to strengthen 
wo1'k on the enterprise management system. In the following April， 
the State Economic Commission E;~も out a broad agenda for the re“ 
form of the internal management organization of the industrial 
SOEs. This agenda included the establishing of the factory director 
responsibility system， the introduction of quality control mecha-
lJ4 nisms and economic accounting systems， the raising of the leve1 of 
the technica1 education of the industrial staff and workers， the re-
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form of the system for wages and bonuses， the protection of the 
rights of workers， and the adoption of the principles of democratic 
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management.'41 Subsequent to this， the State CounciI directed that 
its leading departmental administrative organs with responsibility 
for'macro噸economicaffairs should select certain industrial SOEs as 
test sites for the implementation of management reforms. Thus it 
was that in May 1979， the State Economic Commission， the Minis-
try of Finance， the Ministηof Foreign Trade， the People's Bank of 
China， the State Administration for Materials and the State De-
partment of Labour formally announced the designation of eight 
major industrial SOEs in Beijing， Tianjin and Shanghai for the in-
troduction of the reformed enterprise management structure on a 
pilot-scheme basis.'451 By出eearly 1980s， the number of industrial 
SOEs used as test sit四 forthe management reforms had greatly ex-
panded， and most local govemment authorities were actively in-
volved in introducing the reformed enterprise management struc-
ture， albeit not without some opposition from the CPC committee 
o節cialsand the workers' platforms from within the industrial SOEs. 
As part of the reform of the intemal organizational structure of 
the industrial SOEs， the Party-State leadership moved to define the 
status of the workers' congresses， and hence to regularize their role 
and functions in relation to the CPC committees and the industrial 
management oficials. The intention was very much to underline 
role differentiation as between the enterprise management， the 
workers' representative organizations and the ，CPC committee secre-
taries; and to underline the subordination of the workers' represen-
tative organizations旬 theenterprise management and the CPC 
committees. 1n July 1981， the State Council issued provisional 
regulations for implementation in the test-site industrial SOEs， 
?
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which affirmed the central importance of the workers' congresses 
and defined their rights and responsibilities. At the same time， 
however， the provisional re郡llationsprovided that the workers' con-
gresses were to support the enterprise managers and directors， and 
to accept the supervisory leadership of the CPC commit胎es.146
To emphasize the subordination of the enterprise workers 01'同
ganizations to the system of CPC committees， the Central Commit-
tee of the CPC and the State Council proceeded late in 1981 to is-
sue a joint circular， where it was stipulated that the essential pur-
pose of the State Council provisional regulations of July 1981 had 
been to affirm the establishment of the factory director responsibil岨
ity system and the system of workers' congresses under the leader-
ship of the CPC committees. It was proposed in the joint circular 
that the trade union organization自ofthe industrial workers were to 
select deputy CPC secretaries and vice-management officials in the 
industrial SOEs to act as chairmen of the workers' congresses， in 
order to strengthen the functional co-ordination between the enter-
prise management， the CPC secretaries and the enterprise work-
ers.147 What was implicit in this was that the workers' congresses 
were to be treated as subordinate to the enterprise management 
and the CPC secretaries. This implication was to be confirmed in 
September 1986， when the July 1981 provisional regulations of the 
State Council relating to the workers' congresses in the industrial 
SOEs were promulgated， without much change to their contents， as 
the standard form regulations of the State Council in recognition of 
their successful implementation in the industrial SOEs that had 
been selected as test sites for the industrial reforms.[481 
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In addition to defining the status and position of the workers' 
congresses in the internal management organization of the indu日酔
trial SOEs， there was the further task for the Party酬Stateleader-
ship of defining the status and position of the CPC committee secre骨
組ries，so as to set limits to their powers to intervene in the opera-
tional management of the industrial SOEs. In June 1982， the Cen-
tral Committee of the CPC issued provisional regulations relating to 
the work of CPC grassωroots organs in the industrial SOEs. The 
provisional regulations provided that the CPC secretaries in the in-
dustrial SOEs were to exercise supervisoηfunctions， but to leave 
the operational functions of the enterprises to the industrial man-
agement officials. At the same time， itwas a出rmedthat al grass-
roots-level CPC organs were to act to supervise and monitor the 
work of the enterprise managers and the industrial workers， but 
that there was to be no direct interference in the production func-
tions of the industrial SOES.191 The provisional regulations企om
June 1982 were to be promulgated in standard form in September 
1986 as regulations of the State Council. The September 1986 
re伊llationsendorsed the principle of role differentiation as between 
the management officials， industrial workers and CPC organs. 
τもerewas also a stipulation of the rights and responsibilities of the 
CPC committees in their status as the principal supervisory bodies， 
and principal monitoring agencies， for the management 0ぢicialsand 
industrial workers within the overal1 internal management organ-
izational structure of the industrial SOES.1fiOI 
While the Party-State leadership in the 1980s clearly empha-
sized the status and role of the CPC committee secretaries， and the 
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七132 
The Internal Organizational Structure of the Industrial State-Owned 
Enterprises in the People's Republic ofChina: 1949-1986 (Covel) 
status and role of the workers' congresses， inthe internal manage-
ment organization of the industrial SOEs， the main thrust and di嶋
rection of the reform policy as regards the internal enterprise man剥
agement organization lay with the empowerment of the enterprise 
managers and directors with respect to the basic production func-
tions of the industrial SOEs. In this sense， itwas the factory direc-
tor responsibility system that was central to the internal organiza-
tional structure of the industrial SOEs， as this was reformed after 
1978， albeit that this responsibility system was set in the wider 
framework of democratic management through the workers' con-
gresses and supervision through the CPC committees. 
Thus in January 1982， the State Council issued provisional 
regulations that related to the powers of the factory directors in the 
industrial SOEs. According to these provisional regulations， the 
factory directors， ormanagers， were formally recognized as adminis事
trative personnel， and as the designated agents of the state晒
governmental authorities with responsibilities for the industrial 
SOEs and for the management of their business operations. In 
principle， the factory directors were placed in日ubordinationto the 
workers' congresses and to the CPC committees. For the factory di楢
rectors were required to consult with the workers' congresses in re-
spect of the production plans and operational planning of the indus-
trial SOEs， and to submit work reports to the workers' congresses. 
At the same time， the factory directors were required to submit to 
the supervision and monitoring， and hence to accept the leadership， 
of the CPC committee secretaries who were established in the in-
dustrial SOEs. Nevertheless， the subjection of the factory direcωrs 
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to the workers' congresses and CPC committees carried litle by 
way of practical effect for the differentiated role， functions and pow-
ers that were specific to the factory directors. For the factory direc-
tors were， under the 1982 provisional regulations， assigned ultimate 
responsibility for the exercise of the decisiorトmakingpowers relat-
ing to the industrial SOEs and to their production tasks and opera-
tional management.151! The position of the factory directors， as the 
management officials bearing ultimate re日ponsibilityand decision-
making powers in the industrial SOEs， was further endorsed in 
September 1986， when the State Council issued standard目白rm
regulations that confirmed the 1982 provisional regulations， and 
that， indoing so， gave formal legal effect to the principles of the fac副
tory director responsibi1ity system.1521 
From 1981 to 1986， then， the Party-State leadership acted to 
estab1ish a reformed internal organizational structure for the man-
agement of the industrial SOEs， with this being based in the differ-
entiated ro1es， functions and powers of the workers' congresses， the 
CPC committees and the factory directors that stood as the basic in-
stitutiona1 components of the enterprise management system. The 
State Counci1 regulations from September 1986 stated， and gave 1e-
gal effect to， the principles re1ating to the rights and responsibilities 
of the workers' congresses， the CPC committee secretaries and the 
factory directors in the internal organizational structure of the in-
dustrial SOEs， and it was the organizationa1 e:tructure for the enter.‘ 
prises as described in the 1986 regulations which was to be adopted 
in the landmark 1988 Enterprise Law of the PRC.'日!
The endorsement given in the 1986 State Council regulations to 
?
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the factory directors， as the bearers of the decision-making powers 
for the production management of the industrial SOEs， reflected the 
influence at that time of the liberal economic reform policies of Zhao 
Ziyang. For these were policies that were aimed very much at cu子
tailing the role of the CPC organs at the grass-roots levels of state 
and society in the PRC， and especially so in relation to the internal 
organizational structure of the industrial enterprises. Following the 
removal from office of Zhao Ziyang at the height of the Tiananmen 
Square disorders of 1989 and the subsequent consolidation of power 
by Jiang Zemin， the role of the CPC committee secretaries was to 
be considerably strengthened， with this underlining what was the 
continuing presence and influence of the CPC grass-roots organs 
within the internal management structure of the industrial SOEs. 
Even so， itis as well to emphasize that despite the shift back to・
wards the CPC committee secretaries that came with the discredit格
ing of Zhao Ziyang， the fact remains that the internal organiza-
tional structure for the management of the industrial SOEs has 
since the 1980s been based consistently in the principle of role dif-
ferentiation as between the industrial workers， the CPC ∞mmittee 
secretaries and the enterprise management officials. This is the 
crucial consideration in estimating what is the great significance of 
the 1986 State Council re郡llationsin the context of the post-1978 
state industrial sector reform in the PRC. This is so for the reason 
that the entrenching of the principle of role differentiation， as con-
firmed in the 1986 State Council regulations， has secured to the 
management officials a determinate status and position within the 
internal organizational structure of the industrial SOEs， inaddition 
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to a 1'eal and substantial measu1'e of independence f1'om the wo1'k-
e1's' 1'ep1'esentative organs and the CPC committee bodies.1541 
The status and position assigned to the facto1'Y di1'ecto1's within 
the diffe1'entiated internal o1'ganizational st1'uctu1'e of the indust1'ial 
SOEs， as this was desc1'ibed in the 1986 State Council 1'egulations， 
ma1'ked a decisive b1'eak with the anti-manage1'ialist t1'ends in in嗣
dust1'ial p1'oduction that had manifested themselves du1'ing the 
G1'eat Leap Forwa1'd and the Cultu1'al Revolution~ Howeve1'， the 
st1'engthening of the position of the ente1'p1'ise management officials， 
as this was bound up with the endo1'sement of the facto1'Y di1'ector 
responsibility system in the 1980s， did not involve any 1'eturn to the 
centralized political command o1'ganizational cont1'ol st1'Ilctu1'e fo1' 
the industrial SOEs， as this had been developed in the PRC in the 
1950s. On the cont1'ary， the assignment of ente1'p1'ise 1'esponsibility 
to the facto1'Y di1'ecto1's， and the diffe1'entiation in 1'ole， functions 
and powe1's as between the ente1'p1'ise management 0伍cialsand the 
industrial wo1'ke1's and CPC committee sec1'etaries， we1'e intended 
by the Party-State leade1'ship to establish an internal o1'ganiza-
tional st1'ucture fo1' the management of the indust1'ial SOEs which 
would be app1'opriate fo1' the delegation to them of independent and 
decent1'alized decision-making powers. 
In the light of this， it is quite clear， in retrospect， that the re-
forms of the internal management organizational st1'ucture for the 
indust1'ial SOEs that were effected in the 1980s constituted a cru晴
cial t1'ansitional stage in the refo1'm p1'ogramme for the industrial 
SOEs. For the factOlγdirector responsibility system， as this was 
endorsed in the 1982 provisional regulations and the 1986 regula哨
?????
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tions of the State Council， was subsequently to be fully confirmed in 
the 1988 Enterprise Law. Thus the Enterprise Law identified the 
factory directo1's as management officials holding the central leader司
ship position within the internal o1'ganizational structu1'e of the in-
dustrial SOEs， and expressly attributed to the factory di1'ectors the 
formal status of the legal representatives of the industrial SOEs. At 
the same time， the Ente1'prise Law provided fo1' the assignment to 
the factory di1'ecto1's of the va1'ious 1'ights and duties delegated to 
the indust1'ial SOEs which we1'e bound up with the possession and 
exe1'cise by the indust1'ial SOEs of independent decision-making 
powe1's， and which we1'e intended by the Party町Stateleade1'ship to 
1'ende1' the industrial SOEs mo1'e adequately responsive to the disci-
plinary mechanisrns of the market. So， for example， the industrial 
SOEs we1'e 1'ecognized to have delegated 1'ights involving independ-
ent decision-making powers in respect of such ma1'ket-1'elated mat冊
ters as the setting of p1'ices fo1' ent.:3rprise p1'oducts， the use of state-
allocated enterprise funds， and tlw determination of the wages and 
bonuses of the enterprise wo1'kers. These， itis plain， were a1 rights 
that， as exercised by the factory dlrぞctorsin their legal 1'ep1'esenta-
tive status， were c1'itical to the pussibility of the facto1'Y di1'ector 
management officials being considered to have 1'eal and proper 1'e-
sponsibility fo1' the economic pe1'formance of the industrial SOEs.1問
In the longer run， the internal organizational st1'uctu1'e fo1' the 
management of the indust1'ial SOEs， as this was described in the 
1986 State Council 1'egulations and the 1988 Enterp1'ise Law， was 
to unde1'go a qualitative transformation in consequence of the p1'om-
ulgation in 1993 of the Co1'po1'ation Law of the PRC. Fo1' the terms 
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of the Corporation Law provided for the incorporation of the indus国
trial SOEs， and this meant that the internal orgamzational struc畑
山reof the industrial SOEs was no longer merely a structure of in-
dustrial management based in the possession and exercise of inde-
pendent decision-making powers. Rather， incorporation according 
to law meant that the industrial SOEs were to become subject to a 
structure of corporate governance， where this provided that the in-
dependent decision-making powers belonging to the industrial en同
terprises were to be exercised through the complex of institutional 
offices specific to commercial corporations. 
The governance structures prescribed for the different forms of 
corporation recognized in the 1993 Corporation Law were such as to 
provide for the assured participation of the CPC committee secre-
taries， and that of the representatives of the industrial workers， in
the management organization of the incorporated industrial SOEs. 
However， the central component part of the prescribed corporate 
governance structures lay with the organization of institutional 
management offices in relation to the disposition of rights of owner暢
ship. This was true for the industrial SOEs that were to be estab-
lished as limited liability corporations and joint町stockcorporations， 
where with such corporation forms it was provided that capital in-
vestment funding might be supplied by non-state parties through 
the system of share-holding， and hence that non-state parties might 
acquire ownership rights. For， here， the corporate governance 
structures were such that the share-holders， as bearers of owner-
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directors whose executive powers included the appointment of the 
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officials who would exe1'cise the 1'ights and 1'esponsibilities con-
cerned with the management of the inco1'po1'ated ente1'p1'ises. A dif-
fe1'ent institutional a1'1'angement applied with the governance of the 
co1'po1'ations that we1'e specified in the Co1'po1'ation Law as state-
exclusive investment co1'po1'ations. Fo1' these we1'e co1'po1'ations 
whe1'e al capital investment was to be supplied by the state on a 
sole and exclusive basis， and hence where owne1'ship rights 1'e-
mained vested in the state. In consequence， the1'e we1'e as such no 
share幽holde1'sto be involved in the governance st1'uctu1'e fo1' the in-
dustrial 80Es established as state欄exclusiveinvestment co1'po1'a-
tions. Even so， it1'emains the case， he1'e， that the state， as beare1' 
of owne1'ship 1'ights in the state司exclusiveinvestment inco1'po1'ated 
indust1'ial 80Es， was to be 1'ep1'esented th1'ough boa1'ds of di1'ecto1's， 
and through the management officials appointed by the boards， at
the institutional level of co1'porate governance.1561 
The 1993 Corpo1'ation Law opened up new roads in the process 
of state industrial secto1' 1'efo1'm in the PRC. 80， fo1' example， the 
inco1'po1'ation of the indust1'ial 80Es pointed towa1'ds a diversifica静
tion in the sources fo1' their capitaI investment funding， with al 
that this implied as 1'ega1'ds the greater availability of capital in-
vestment f1'om the p1'ivate sphe1'e， and as 1'ega1'ds the greater ac-
countability of the state indust1'ial sector to the ma1'kets. Then 
again， inco1'po1'ation pointed towa1'ds the 1'adical 1'ed1'awing of the 
fo1'mal relation under law as between the state and the industrial 
80Es， with al that this implied as 1'ega1'ds an enhancing in the 
1'elative independence of the state indust1'ial secto1' from the system 
of government and political administ1'ation. The concern of this pa-
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per has been with the development of the intemal management or-
ganization of the industrial SOEs. Given this， it is to be empha-
sized that the govemance structures for the inco叩oratedindustrial 
SOEs， as specified in the Corporation Law， pointed to a general 
strengthening in the powers and authority of the management ofi-
cials， and this for the reason that the prescribed corporate govern-
ance structures served to give determinate legal form and legal ef-
fect to the differentiation in role， functions and powers as between 
the ente叩巾emanagement officials， the CPC committee officials 
and the representatives of the industrial workers. Thus the man-
agement 0:伍cialsin the incorporated industrial SOEs were differen-
tiated in their role， functions and powers by virtue of their being 
the occupants of corporation 0血ceswith distinct institutional stand-
ings and capacities as defined in law， and hence set apart in speciι 
cally legal terms企omal other 0部cials.In this respect certainly， 1 
would underline in concluding， the Corporation Law was continuous 
in its logic and direction with the terms of the 1986 State Council 
re伊1lationsand the 1988 Enterprise Law. 
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Concise History of the Communist p，αrty ofChinα， p.446. 
15. For the details concerning these matters， see: Chu-yuan Cheng， 
Chinaイ'8Economic Development: Growth and Structur，α1 Chαnge 
(Boulder， Colorado: Westview Press， 1982)， pp. 339-42. See also: 
HlI Sheng (ed.)， A Concise History of the Communist p，αrty of 
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Chinα， pp. 428， 450. 
16. For an indication of the policy preferences of the Party-State 
leadership concerning this， see: 
Directive of the State Council Calling on the State-Owned En幽
terprises to Rely on the Indigenous Local lndustrial Capability 
for the Construction of New Factories or Expansion of Ancillary 
Factories (Workshops). 
Guowuyuan Guanyu Guoying Qiye Xinjian Huo Jianfushu 
Gongchang (chejian) de Shihou Ying Chongfen Liyong Yuanyou 
Difang Gongye Shengchan Nengli de Zhishi. 
Compilation， July嶋December1955， pp. 603-5. 
17. For details of this， see: Dαngdαi Zhongguo de Lαodong Bαohu 
(Lαbour Protection in Contemporary Chinα)， ed. Deng Lijun， Ma 
Hong， Wu Heng (PRC， Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo Chubanshe， 
1992)， p.6. 
18. The policy of learning from non-CPC technical personnel was 
stil being advocated by the Party-State leadership as late as 
1956， even though at that time the official policy for the onか
man management system was to shift the system in favour of 
CPC committee secretaries acting as enterprise leaders. 
On this， see: 
Political Work Report Delivered by Liu Shaoqi for the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China to the 8th Nか
tional Party Congress. 
Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhon回rangWeiyuanhui Xiang Di'Baci 
Quanguo Daibiao Dahui de Zhengzhi Baogao. Liu Shaoqi. 
Compilαtion， July-December 1956， pp. 19-86， especially pp. 35-6. 
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19. On the centralized job-assigment system， see: Deng Lijun， Ma 
Hong， Wu Heng (eds.)， nαngdαi Zhongguo de Laodong Guanli， 
p.7. 
20. As regards the use of the centralized state-stipulated bonus sys-
tem to promote technological work in the industrial SOEs， see: 
Provisional Regulations on the Awarding of Bonuses for Innova-
tions， Technical Improvements and Rationalization Proposals. 
Guanyu Shengchan de Faming， Jishu Gaijin Ji Helihua Jianyi 
de Jiangli Zanxing Tiaoli. 
Compilαtion， January-September 1954， pp. 62-9. (Note: this 
Regulation was passed by the Government Administrative 
Council in May 1954， and issued in August 1954.) 
Explanation of the State Council on the Implemental Problems 
of the Provisional Regulations on the Awarding of Bonuses for 
Innovations， Technical Improvements and Rationalization Pro-
posals. 
Guowuyuan Dui Zhixing Youguan Shengchan de Faming， Jishu 
Gaijin Ji Helihua Jianyi de Jiangli Zanxing Wenti Tiaoli Rou-
gan Wenti de Jieshi. 
Compilαtion， September 1954・June1955， pp. 430・4.
21. As an example of the general policy for promoting technological 
development in industrial production， the Minis位yof Heavy In-
dustry acted in 1954 and 1955 to promote co・operativelinks be-
tween the industrial SOEs and the technical research centres 
and high schools. In this connection， see: 
Circular of the Ministry of Heavy Industry Concerning the 
Strengthening of Co-operation Between the Industrial SOEs • 
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and the Technical Research Centres and the High Schools. 
Zhonggongyebu Guanyu Jiajiang Shengchan Qiye Yu Kexue 
Yanjiubumen Ji Gaodeng Xuexiao Xiezuo de Tongzhi. 
Compilαtion， September 1954・June1955， pp. 334-5. 
22. Regarding official health and safety at work standards for the 
industrial SOEs， see for example: 
Circular of the Ministry of Labour， the Ministry of Health and 
the All China Federation of Trade Unions Concerning the 
Strengthening of Safety and Health and Cleanliness Work Dur-
ing the Summer and Autumn Seasons. 
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Guanyu Jiajiang Xiaqiuli Anquan Weisheng Gongzuo de Tong-
zhi. 
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ing Taking Precautions Against the High Temperatures During 
the Summer Season. 
Di'yi Jixie Gongyebu Guanyu Yufang Xiaji Gaowen de Zhishi. 
Notice for the Organization of the Industrial Health and Clean-
liness W ork Commission. 
Gongye Weisheng Gongzuo Weiyuanhui Zuzhi Banfa. 
Compilation， September 1954 -.June 1955， pp. 444-6， 456-8， 
513・14.
23. For an indication of the range of welfare services that were pro-
vided for the workers in the industrial SOEs， see for example: 
Directive of the Ministry of Culture and the All China Federa-
tion of Trade Unions Concerning the Opening of Cultural and 
Art Activities in All the Factories and Mines， Industrial Bases 
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Wenhuabu， Zhonghua Quanguo Zonggonghui Guanyu Jinyibu 
Kaizhan Changkuang， Gongdi， Qiyezhong Wenhua Yishu Gong-
zuo de Zhishi. 
Compilation， July-December 1955， pp. 734-43. 
24. On the social welfare provisions for workers in the industrial 
SOEs geIlerally， see: Deng Lijun， Ma Hong， Wu Heng (eds.)， 
Dαngdαi Zhongguo de LαodongBαohu， Chapter 1， especially pp. 
8-9. 
25. Regarding this， see for example: 
Announcement of the AlI China Federation of Trade Unions for 
the National Industrial Workers Guaranteeing the Completion 
and Early Completion of the First Five Year Plan for the Devel圃
opment of the National Economy. 
Zhonghua Qu却炉10Zonggonghui Wei Baozheng Wancheng he 
Chao'e Wancheng Fazhan Guomin Jingji de Di'Yige Wunian Ji-
hua Gaoquanguo Zhigongshu. 
Compilαtion， July-December 1955， pp. 849・57.
26. lt should be noted that the position of the workers' congresses 
in the industrial SOEs was guaranteed in law from the time of 
the establishing of位lecentralized political command form of in-
dustrial direction. In this connection， see Artic1e 16 of the 1982 
State Constitution of the PRC， as this was based in， and reaι 
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27. On this point， see: Deng Lijun， Ma Hong， Wu Heng (eds.)， 
Dαngdαi Zhongguo de Lαodong GuαnU， p.7. 
28. Conceming the Ministry of Labour proposals for the use of con・
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Wu Heng (eds.)， Dangdαi Zhongguo de Lαodong Guαnli， pp. 12・
14. 
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wage reforms， see: 
Decision of the State Council to Reform the Wage System. 
Guowuyuan Guanyu Gongzi Gaige de Jueding. 
State Council Regulations Concerning Several Problems in the 
Reform of the Wage System. 
Guowuyuan Guanyu Gongzi Gaige Zhong Rougan Juti Wenti de 
Guiding. 
Circular of the State Council Concerning the Actual Implemen-
tation Order of the Plan for the Reform of the Wage System. 
Guowuyuan Guanyu Gongzi Gaige Fangan Shishi Chengxu de 
Tongzhi. 
Compilαtion， July-December 1956， pp. 407-12， 412-17， 417-19. 
30. For the Proposals of Liu Shaoqi regarding the reform of the in-
dustrial management system in the direction of democratic par咽
ticipation by the worker自andthe CPC committee officials， see 
the Political Work Report that he delivered to the 8th National 
Congress of the CPC on 9 September 1956. The details for the 
Political Work Report are given in note 18 above， and the refer司
ences from the text as cited for the reform of industrial man-
agement are at pp. 35， 47. For furthe~' discussion of worker 
and CPC committee participation in industrial management， 
see: Franz Schurmann， ldeology αnd Orgα1HZαtion in Commlψ 
nist Chinα，2nd edition (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University 
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Zhongguo de Laodong Guαnli， pp. 10-11. 
32. Directive Concerning the Draft of the R時ulationson the Work 
of the lndustrial State-Owned Enterprises (as issued by the 
Central Committee of the CPC on 16 September 1961). 
Guanyu Taolun he Shixing Guoying Gongye Qiye Gongzuo Tト
aoli (Cao'an) de Zhishi. 
For the contents of the Draft Regulations， see: ZhonghuαRen-
min Gongheguo Dαcidian: 1949・1988(Encycl叩αediαofthePeo-
pZe包 Republicof Chinα: 1949・1988)，ed. Zhang Kemin (PRC， 
Beijing: Zhongguo Guoji Guangbo Chubanshe， 1989)， p.165. 
33. For details here， see: Deng Lijun， Ma Hong， Wu Heng (eds.)， 
Dangdαi Zhongguo de Lαodong Guanli， pp. 12-13. 
34. Regulations of the State Council on the Work of the lndustrial 
State-Owned Enterprises (September 1961). 
Guowuyuan Guan，戸1Yinfa Guoying Gongye Qiye Gongzuo Ti-
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See also: Deng Lijun， Ma Hong， Wu Heng (eds.)， Dangd，αi 
ZhongguoLαodong Guαnli， p.12. 
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Provisional Regulations of the State Council Concerning the 一一ー一一 Use of Part Time Workers by the lndustrial State凶OwnedEn-
Guowuyuan Guanyu Guoying Shiyong Linshi Zhigong de Zanx“ 
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Compilαtion， January 1962 -December 1963， pp. 220-3. 
36. Joint Circular of the AlI China Federation of Trade Unions and 
the Ministry of Labour. 
Zhonghua Quanguo Zonggonghui he Laodongbu de Lianhe 
Tonggao. 
For details and reference for this， see: Deng L.ijun， Ma Hong， 
Wu Heng (eds.)， Dangdαi Zhongguo de Lαodong Guanli， p.16. 
37. Decision of the 11th Plenum of the 8th Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of China Concerning the Great Proletar-
ian Cultural Revolution (8 August 1966). 
Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhongyang Weiyuanhuiち吋ieShiyi 
Zhong Quanhui Guanyu Wuchan Ji吋iWenhua Dageming de 
Jueding. 
For the reference for this， see: WenhuαDα:geming Y.αnjiu Ziliao 
(Cultural Revolution Reseαrch Mαteriα[s)， (Shangce) Volume 1， 
published under the auspices of the People's Liberation Army， 
the Defence University， and the Party History and Administra-
tive Research Centre (PRC， Beijing: 1988)， pp. 72・7.
Regarding the Sixteen Points set out by Mao Zedong in August 
1966， see広:MαoZedong Dαcωidiωαn (Mαo Zedong Enc，りyclゐopαediωfαz)
(PRC， Be，討jing乞:Guang玄iRemロιin
For an indication of the consequences of the Cul比turalRevolu-
tion for mat此tersof economic organization in the PRC， see for 
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Heng (eds.)， Dαngdαi Zhongguo de Lαodong Guαnli， p.16. 
39. On this， see: Deng Lijun， Ma Hong， Wu Heng (eds.)， D，αn:gdαi 
Zhongguo de Lαodong Guαnli， p.19. 
40. In this connection， see the Party-State document issued on 18 
August 1975 under位leauspices of Deng Xiaoping: 
Several Problems Conceming the Strengthening of Industrial 
Development. 
Guanyu Jiajiang Gongye Fazhan de Rougan Wenti. 
For the main contents of the document， see: ZhonghuαRenmin 
Gongheguo D，αcidiαn: 1949・1988，p. 127. 
41. For an indication of the central importance that was accorded 
to the delegation of economic decision-making powers to the in-
dustrial SOEs in the period after the 3rd Plenum of the 11th 
Central Committee of the CPC， see for example the editorial in 
Renmin Ribαo伊'eople'sDaily)ゐr19 February 1979:官ixu
Kuoda Qiye de Quanli' (‘It is Imperative to Expand the Decision-
Making Powers of the En胎rprises').
42. The five regulations of the State Council of 13 July 1979 were 
as follows: 
1. Several Regulations Conceming the Expansion of the Decision-
Making Powers of the Industrial State-Owned Enterprises. 
Guanyu Kuoda Guoying Gongye Qiye Jingying Guanli Zizhu-
quan de Rougan Guiding. 
2. Regulations Conceming the Retention of Profits by the In-
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Guan戸1Guoying Gongye Qiye Shixing Lirun Liucheng de Guid-
mg. 
3. Provisional Regulations Concerning the 拡ethodfor the Use 
of Raising of the Rate of Depreciation for the Fixed Assets and 
the Depreciation Expense. 
Guanyu Tigao Guoying Gongye Qiye Guding Zichan Zhejiulu he 
Gaijin Zhejiufei Shiyong Banfa de Zanxing Guiding. 
4. Provisional Regulations Concerning the Collection of Fixed 
Assets Taxes of the lndustrial State-Owned Enterprises. 
Guan界1Kaizheng Guoying Gongye Qiye Guding Zichanshui de 
Zanxing Guiding. 
5. Provisional Regulations Concerning the Implementation of 
Bank Credits as the Total Amount of Working Capital in the 
Industrial State-Owned Enterprises. 
Guanyu Guoying Gongye Qiye Shixing Liudong Zijin Quan'e 
Xindai de Zanxing Guiding. 
Compilαtion， January-December 1979， pp. 249-62‘ 
43. For the State Council statement relating to the test-site-based 
implementation of the five regulations， see: 
Notice of the State Council Concerning the Organization of Test 
Sites Based in the Five Documents on Reform of the Manage-
ment System. 
Guowu戸lanGuanyu Anzhao Wu'ge Gaige Guanli Tizhi Wenjian 
Zuzhi Shidian de Tongzhi. 
Compilαtion， January-December 1979， p.262. 
44. For the details of the proposals of the State Economic Commis刷
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45. For the notice concerning this as issued by the State Economic 
Commission， the Ministry of Finance， the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade， the People's Bank of China， the State Administration for 
班aterialsand the State Department of Labour on 25 May 1979， 
see as follows: 
Notice Concerning the Experiment of Reform of the Manage-
ment System in Eight lndustrial State司OwnedEnterprises from 
Beijing， Tia吋inand Shanghai. 
Guanyu Zai Jing， Jin， Hu San Shi Bage Qiye Jinxing Qiye 
Guanli Gaige Shidian de Tongzhi. 
For the reference for this， see: Kaituo de Zuji: 1978-1990nian 
Gαige K.，αifang Jishi (The Path of Opening-Up: The Trαck Re-
cord of Reformαnd Opening tトom1978 to 1990)， ed. Dong 
Yingfu (PRC， Beijing: Gaige Chubanshe， 1992)， p.11. 
???
46. Provisional Regulations Concerning the Workers' Congresses in 
the Wholly State-Owned lndustrial Enterprises. 
Quanmin Suoyuozhi Gongye Qiye Zhigong Daibiao Da，hui Zanx-
ing Tiaoli. 
Compilαtion， January“December 1981， pp. 213-18. 
47. For the joint circular， as issued by the Central Committee of 
the CPC and the State Council on 30 July 1981， see: 
Circular of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China and the State Council Transmitting the Provisional 
Regulations Concerning the Workers' Congresses in the Wholly 
State申Ownedlndustrial Enterprises. 
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Zhonggong Zhongyang， Guowuyuan Guanyu Zhuanfa Guoying 
Gongye Qiye Zhigong Daibiao Dahui Zanxing Tiaoli de Tongzhi. 
Compilαtion， January-December 1981， pp. 219-20. 
48. For the regulations relating to the workers' congresses as prom-
ulgated by the Central Committee of the CPC and the State 
Council on 9 September 1986， see: 
Regulations Concerning the Workers' Congresses in the Wholly 
State-Owned lndustrial Enterprises. 
Quanmin Suoyouzhi Gongye Qiye Zhigong Daibiao Dahui Tiaoli. 
Compilαtion， January-December 1986， pp. 601-8. 
49. Provisional Regulations of the Central Committee of the Com-
munist Party of China Concerning the Grass Roots Organs in 
the Wholly State-Owned lndustrial Enterprises. 
Zhongguo Gongchandang Gongye Qiye Jiceng Zuzhi Gongzuo 
Zanxing Tiaoli. 
In this connection， see also: 
Provisional Regulations of the Central Committee of the Com-
munist Party of China Concerning the Grass Roots Organs in 
the Financial and Economic Enterprise臼.
Zhongguo Gongchandang Caimao Qiye Jiceng Zuzhi Gongzuo 
Zanxing Tiaoli. 
Both of these regulations were issued on 3 June 1982 by the 
Central Committee of the CPC. For details， see: Dong Yingfu 
(ed.)， IGαituo de Zuji: 1978-1990niαnGαほどKαifang Jishi， p.87. 
50. Regulations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party 
of China Concerning the Grass Roots Organs in the Wholly 
State-Owned lndustrial Enterprises. 
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Zhongguo Gongchandang Quanmin Suoyouzhi Gongye Qiye 
Jiceng Zuzhi Gongzuo Tiaoli. 
Compilation， January-December 1986， pp. 593-600. 
51. Provisional Regulations Concerning the Work of the Factory Di・
rectors of the lndustrial State-Owned Enterprises. 
Quanmin Suoyouzhi Gongye Qiye Changzhang Gongzuo Zanx-
ing Tiaoli. 
Compilation， January-December 1982， pp. 377-84. 
52. Regulations Concerning the W ork of the Fadory Directors of 
the Industrial State‘Owned Enterprises. 
Quanmin Suoyouzhi Gongye Qiye Changzhang Gongzuo Tiaoli. 
Compilαtion， January-December 1986， pp. 583-92. 
53. For a summary account of the rights and responsibilities of the 
workers' congresses， the CPC committees and the factory direc-
tors within the internal organizational structure of the indus-
trial SOEs， as these are set down in the various regulations 
from September 1986， see: Qり'eNeibu Jingji Zerenzhi (The In-
ternα1 Responsibiliか System in the Enterprises)， ed. He 
Tianyuan (PRC， Beijing: Nengyuan Chubanshe， 1988)， pp. 35耐
42. 
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54. On the reforms proposed by Zhao Ziyang with respect to the 0ト
ganization and powers of the CPC organs， the removal of Zhao 
Ziyang and the consolidation of power by Jiang Zemin in conse鋼
quence of the 1989 Tiananmen Square disorders， and the rela-
tion of this to the question of role differentiation in the organ‘ 
izational management structure of the industrial SOEs， see: 
Covell， 'The Structure of the Communist Party of China and its 
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Control of the Government and the lndustrial State-Owned En-
terprises in the People's Republic of China'， pp. 80“6. 
55， The principles relating to the 0節目 offactory director are set 
out in Chapter 4 (Articles 44・48)of the Enterprise Law， with 
the legal representative status of the factory director being af-
firmed in Article 45. The rights and duties belonging to the in-
dustrial SOEs through delegation that relate to the office of fac-
tory director are set out in Chapter 3 (Articles 22-43) of the En-
terprise Law. For the definitive statement of the delegated en-
terprise rights and duties， however， see Articles 8-21 and Arti-
cles 23-30 of the 1992 Regulations on Changing the Operating 
Mechanisms of the State駒OwnedEnterprises. 
56. For the specifications of limited liability corporations， state-
exclusive investment corporations and joint-stock corporations 
where their form of governance臼tructuresare detailed， see re構
spectively: Corporation Law， Chapter 2， Articles 19-63， Chapter 
2， Articles 64・72，Chapter 3 (Articles 73 to 128). 
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